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HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENf: THE QUEST 
FOR TRUTH IN A FREE SOCIETY 
Kenneth Lasson· 
INTRODUCTION 
Veritas vos liberabit. t 
35 
From the ashes of the Holocaust we have come once again to learn 
the terrible truth, that the power of Evil cannot be underestimated. 
Nor can the effect of the spoken and written word. It has been but a 
half-century since the liberation of Nazi death camps, a little more than a 
decade since the First International Conference on the Holocaust and 
Human Rights,2 and a few short years since the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum fIrst put on display its documentation of horror. Yet 
today that form of historical revisionism popularly called "Holocaust deni-
al" abounds worldwide in all its full foul flourish. As the generation of 
survivors dwindles, whose words will win? 
In a global environment increasingly dominated by mass media of 
manifold form and format, we have also begun to understand that what is 
printed on paper or broadcast on television or bytten into cyberspace 
affects everyone, actually or subliminally. Conversely, what is rejected or 
otherwise left out is doomed to the World of Communication Failure or, 
worse, of Ignorance and Misunderstanding. 
Who decides what is to appear in the vast and burgeoning market-
place of ideas? Many of those important choices are vested in editors and 
publishers, upon whom the Constitution confers almost unfettered discre-
tion.3 Restrictions are few and seldom imposed; for the most part journal-
ists can write, say, depict-or ignore-just about anything they want. And 
that's the way we like it. That's the American way. Freedom of thought 
and expression, after all, is one of our most hallowed liberties-limited 
• Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. The author thanks Brian L. Moffet of the University 
of Baltimore School of Law for his diligent research assistance; Prof. Gerald Zuriff of Wheaton College 
(Mass.) for his insightful comments on the manuscript during its preparation; and Jesse D. Lyon and 
Brock A. Swanzle of the George Mason Law Review for their excellent editorial comments and 
suggestions. 
1 "The truth shall make you free." 
2 The conference, sponsored by the Boston College Law School HolocaustIHurnan Rights Re-
search Project and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, was held on April 17, 1986. See 
Debate, Freedom of Speech and Holocaust Denial, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 559 (1987). 
3 See U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
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only by circumstances where actual harm has been caused or is reasonably 
perceived as imminent. If a line can be drawn at all between unfair 
suppression of thought on the one hand and good editorial judgment on the 
other, it is sometimes exceedingly faint, often entirely arbitrary, and always 
fundamentally subjective. The greater the opportunity for excess in the 
exercise of the power of the press, the more profoundly difficult the con-
sequences in the protection of civil liberties for individuals. 
That axiom has been brought into sharp focus by Holocaust deniers, 
whose goal is both enhanced and complicated by the aura of "political 
correctness" which nowadays surrounds a great deal of editorial decision-
making. Nowhere is this more pervasive than in Academia. What should 
be the most receptive place for honest intellectual inquiry and discourse 
has instead become one where all assumptions are open to debate--even 
documented historical facts. This has had an unsettling effect on student 
editors, who have long been responsive to the pressures of political 
correctness. When they become entangled in the black and nefarious 
thickets of Holocaust denial, their exercise of editorial discretion can be 
intellectually excruciating. 
So can the emotional pain suffered by victims of group libel. Reme-
dies for that malady have not been clearly established in American law. 
Nor has the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress been ade-
quately tested against traditional free-speech guarantees. Explored least of 
all is the effect upon a free society when the dissemination of demonstra-
bly false ideas is Constitutionally protected. 
Must writers and speakers who deny the Holocaust be guaranteed 
equal access to curricula and classrooms? Should responsible libraries 
collect and classify work born of blatant bigotry? Have survivors been 
injured when their victimization has been repudiated? 
More profoundly, can we reject spurious revisionism, or punish 
purposeful expressions of hatred, and still pay homage to the liberty of 
thought ennobled by the First Amendment? Should the People have the 
power to suppress the misrepresentation of historical fact when it is 
motivated by nothing more than racial animus? Are some conflicts between 
freedom of expression and civility as insoluble as they are inevitable? Can 
history ever be proven as Truth? 
This Article attempts to answer those questions. 
I. HOLOCAUST DENIAL 
We will show you these concentration camps in motion pictures, just as 
the Allied annies found them when they arrived . . . . Our proof will be 
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disgusting and you will say I have robbed you of your sleep .... I am one 
who received during this war most atrocity tales with suspicion and scepticism. 
But the proof here will be so overwhelming that I venture to predict not one 
word I have spoken will be denied. 
- Sen. Thomas Dodd (1947)' 
The devastating truth about the Holocaust is that it was a fact, not a 
dream. And the devastating truth about the Holocaust deniers is that they will 
go on using whatever falsehoods they can muster, and taking advantage of 
whatever vulnerabilities in an audience they can find, to argue, with skill and 
evil intent, that the Holocaust never happened. By being vigilant to these argu-
ments we can all fight this second murder of the lews-fight it, and weep not 
only for the victims' mortality but also for the fragility, and mortality, of 
memory. 
- Sen. Orrin Hatch (1995)~ 
A. Nazis, Nuremberg, and the Origins of Revisionism 
37 
The Nazis themselves recognized that the incredibility of what they 
had done would cast shadows of doubt upon any eyewitness reports. 
Inmates at concentration camps testified that they were frequently taunted 
by their captors: "And even if some proof should remain and some of you 
survive, people will say that the events you describe are too monstrous to 
be believed; they will say that they are the exaggerations of Allied propa-
ganda and will believe us, who will deny everything, and not you.'>6 
Early newspaper accounts of the camps were obscured by dispatches 
about the war's progress, if not indeed questioned for their veracity.7 That 
is why after the Nazis were conquered, every American soldier not commit-
ted to the front lines was ordered to visit the death camps, so as to bear 
witness to places like Auschwitz, Belsen, and Buchenwald.8 It likewise 
explains why the Nuremberg Tribunal was so intent on documenting all of 
the atrocities found by the Allied liberators. "The things I saw beggar 
description," said General Dwight D. Eisenhower in a statement now etched 
• 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CluMINALS BEFORE THE OO'L MILITARY TRIBUNAL 130 (1947). 
Sen. Dodd served as the executive counsel to the American prosecutorial team. 
, 141 CONGo Roc. S16853 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (quoting Dr. 
Walter Reich, Executive Director, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum). 
• PRIMo LEvI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 11-12 (Raymond Rosenthal trans., Vintage Int'l 
1989). 
7 Both the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune published repons of the camps as 
early as 1942. See WALTER LAQUEUR, THE TERRIBLE SECRET: SUPPRESSION OF THE TRl.TI1I ADOlIT 
HrI1JlR's "FINAL SOLlmON" 74, 93 (1980). 
8 See ROBERT H. AlIzua, INSIDE THE VICIOUS HEART: AMERICANS AND THE LIBERATION OF 
NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMPS 128 (1985). 
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in stone at the entrance to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Wash-
ington, D.C. "I made the visit deliberately, in order to be in a position to 
give frrst-hand evidence of these things if ever, in the future, there develops 
a tendency to charge these allegations merely to propaganda.'t9 
Alas, Eisenhower understated the possibilities. In recent years, the 
contention that there was no mass extermination of Jews and no deaths in 
gas chambers at the hands of the Nazis has given rise to a nasty and 
pervasive (if predictable) cottage industry. Holocaust-denial books have 
made their way into university and public libraries across the country and 
around the world. 
Revisionists have also taken to late-night public-access television to 
assert that claims of Nazi genocide against the Jews during World War II 
are part of an elaborate hoax. Slickly produced videos purport to show that 
concentration camps like Auschwitz and Birkenau were recreational 
facilities, not death camps.IO Holocaust deniers claim that archival materi-
als concerning Nazi atrocities-voluminously detailed lists of victims, miles 
of gruesome film footage, II and vividly remembered accounts of eyewit-
nesses-have all been forged. 
Meanwhile, as use of the computer Internet has burgeoned, its millions 
of subscribers provide a vast new target audience for the efforts of numer-
ous hate groups. Catering to white supremacists, anti-government 
survivalists, militiamen and would-be terrorists, Holocaust deniers have set 
up enough new sites on the World Wide Web to reach a larger potential 
constituency than any revolutionaries in history .12 
B. The Academic Voice 
The gradual ascension of Holocaust revisionism into academic respect-
ability has no real parallel. 
In the 1980's, the Committee on Open Debate on the Holocaust 
(CODOH) began to place small notices in college newspapers with its 
9 Letter from General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall (Apr. IS, 1945), in 
THE PAPERS OF DWIGHT DAVID EIsENHOWER: THE WAR YEARS 2616 (Alfred D. Chandler, Ir., ed., 
1970). 
10 See Alan Dershowitz, It's Time for a Holocaust Video, TIMEs-UNION, SepL 4, 1995, at A6. 
II For a detailed analysis of the use of film as evidence of the Holocaust, see Lawrence DougW:. 
Film as Witness: Screening NaD Concentration Camps before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE LJ. 
449 (1995). The principal film described by Douglas also bas been used to prove the falsity of 
Holocaust denials. See Leonidas E. Hill, The Trial of Ernst Zundel and the Law in CQIIQI/Q, 6 SIMON 
WIESENTHAL CENTER ANN. 165, 184 (1989). 
12 See Greg Beck, Hate War's New Banleground: The Internet, S.F. ExAMINER, Iune 10, 1996, 
at AI; infra notes 338-41 and accompanying text; see generally Michael Shermer, Proving the 
Holocaust, 2 SKEPTIC 32 (1994). 
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address and telephone number. By the 1990's these paid advertisements had 
become long essays, written in the academic voice, arguing that Holocaust 
statistics were vastly overstated and that allegations of Nazi gas chambers 
were frauds aided by doctored photographs.13 Over time, in high schools 
and colleges across the country, a number of teachers have come to tell 
their students that the Holocaust was a myth, while professors write 
"scholarly" articles and school newspapers print denial advertisement/essays 
saying the same thing:4 By 1995, the Anti-Defamation League had report-
ed numerous incidents on American campuses concerning Holocaust 
denial. IS 
1. Speakers 
In an academic environment charged with political correctness, the 
choice of campus speakers appears to be highly subjective. Noted anti-
Semites like Louis Farrakhan,I6 Tony Martin,I7 Khalid Abdul Muham-
mad;8 and Leonard Jeffriesl9 are regularly invited by student groups to 
13 See DEBORAH E. LlPsTADT, DENYING TIlE HOLOCAUST: nm GROWING AssAULT ON TRUTH 
AND MEMORY 183-208 (1993). Some campus papers published the advertisements on free-speech 
grounds, while others refused to do so. See infra Pan I.B.3. CODOH is largely the work of Bradley 
Smith. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text Apparently in response to Smith's campaign, 
classes on the Holocaust have been increasing. 
14 See generally KENNEnI S. STERN, HOLOCAUST DENIAL (1993). 
J> See Tat of ADLAudit of Anti-Semitic Incidents 1995, U.S. Newswire, Feb. 28,1996, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, USNWR File [hereinafter ADL Audit); see also Shenner, supra note 12, at 
32. 
16 See ADL Quotes Farrakhan One Year After Million-Man March, U.S. Newswire, Oct 9, 1996; 
Richard Cohen, Why the Silence on Farrakhan, WASH. PoST, July 26,1985, at A25; The Farrakhan 
Show, WASH. PoST, Aug. I, 1984, available in 1984 WL 2024765; Garry Wills, Perot's Anti-Semitic 
Company, TIMEs-UNION, Aug. IS, 1996, at A15. 
11 See Ken Ringle, Of History and Politics: A Classicist at War, INT'L IfERALD TRm., June 12, 
1996; Tat of ADL Report on Writings of Professor Tony Martin, U.S. Newswire, Oct 12, 1995; see 
also Selwyn R. Cudjoe, Academic Responsibility and Black Scholars, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 23, 1994 
at 19A. 
18 See Nat Hentoff, The Return of Khalid Muhammad: "Hitler Used the Same Words About 
Jews," nm VnLAGE VOICE, Nov. 26, 1996, at 10 (quoting Jesse Jackson's characterization of Khalid 
Muhammad's Kean College speech as "racist, anti-Semitic, divisive, untrue, and chilling"); Stephen A. 
Holmes, Farrakhan is Warned Over Aide's Invective, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1994, at A12; Jon 
Nordheimer, Divided by a Diatribe: College Speech Ignites Furor Over Race, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 
1993, at Bl; see also Steven Lubet, That's Funny, You Don't Look Like You Control the Government: 
The Sixth Circuit's Narrative on Jewish Power, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 1527, 1527-28 (1994); Speech: 'The 
Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews: NJ.LJ., Jan. 24, 1994, at 17 (entire text of Khalid 
Muhammad's Kean College speech) [hereinafter Muhammad Speech). 
19 See ADL Audit, supra note 15; Joseph Berger, College Chief Calls Jeffries 'Racist: But 
Defends Keeping Him, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1991, at Bl; Donna Prokop, Note, Controversial Teacher 
Speech: Striking A Balance Between First Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 2534, 2536 (1993); Jacques Steinberg, CUNY Professor Criticizes Jews, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 
1991, at B3; Wills, supra note 16, at A15; see also Oeri J. Yonover, Anti-Semitism and Holocaust 
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appear on protected campus venues. When challenged, the sponsors often 
claim that they and their guests are exercising their First Amendment 
rights.20 
In recent years such speeches have become comm 1nplace. Perhaps the 
most notorious among them was Khalid Abdul Muhammad's address at 
Kean College in 1993, in which he called Jews "blood-suckers of the black 
nation."21 At the Black Holocaust Nationhood Conference, attended by 
some 2,500 people in Washington, D.C. prior to the Million Man March (in 
October of 1995), participants included noted anti-Semitic speakers who 
delivered unvarnished diatribes against Jews.22 "We have lost over 600 
million at the hands of the white man in the last 6000 years," said 
Khalid.23 ''That is [one hundred] times worse than the so-called Holocaust 
of the so-called Jew, the imposter Jew."24 Several 'months earlier, 
Farrakhan had said, "Little Jews died while big Jews made money [during 
World War IT] .•• little Jews [were] being turned into soap while big Jews 
washed themselves with it."25 
An examination of the multifarious First Amendment issues regarding 
the rights that universities must accord to controversial speakers invited 
onto campus by student groups-for example, who bears the responsibility 
for payment of fees and honoraria, security, assurance of equal time for 
other speakers and student groups, the guarantee of an open forum-is 
beyond the purview of this Article.26 
2. Books 
Many of the Holocaust -denial books are published by the so-called 
Institute for Historical Review, a once-obscure revisionist think-tank which 
also produces a glossy periodical called the Journal of Historical Review.n 
Denial in the Academy: A Tort Remedy, 101 DICK. L. REv. 71, 83 n.75 (1996). 
'" See, e.g., Michael W. Sasser, SpeaJcers Find Coz:y Home at Universities, PALM BEACH lEWISH 
1., luly 23, 1996, at 1. 
21 See Muhammad Speech, supra note 18. 
n See ADL Audit, supra note 15. 1be Black Holocaust Nationhood Conference was held at two 
Washington, D.C., high schools. See id. 
2J Id. 
2A Id. Other conference speakers included Professors Martin and leffries. 
2J Text 0/ ADL Report 'Federal Funds for NOI Security Firms: Financing Farrakhan's Ministry 
a/Hate: U.S. Newswire, Sept 22, 1995. 
'" The range of controversial speakers runs the gamut from anti-abortionists to xenophobic 
isolationists, but even an analysis limited to garden-variety hate speech can run well beyond the scope 
of this article, which limits itself to the subject of Holocaust denial. 
27 A self -described "historical revisionist society," the Institute supports the idea that the 
Holocaust was a distortion of history. See 1 ENcyo.oPEDIA OF AsSOCIATIONS 9 (lSS72) (Sandra 
loszczak ed., 31st ed. 1996); see also LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at lOS; Yonover, supra note 19, at 76 
n.30. 
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The Institute was founded by a notorious anti-Semite, Willis CartO.28 
Today it operates out of Newport Beach, California, and is closely as-
sociated with a non-academic named Bradley Smith.29 
Among its most popular tracts are The Hoax of the Twentieth Centu-
,yo by Northwestern University Professor Arthur Butz, and Debunking the 
Genocide Myth31 by Paul Rassinier. Both present the now-familiar argu-
ment that reports of the systematic killing of Jews in Nazi concentration 
camps were myths propagated by Zionists in an effort to create support for 
a Jewish state in Palestine.32 
Even more notoriety comes to people like Ernst Zundel, David Irving, 
and Roger Garaudy. 
Zundel became front-page news in Canada for contributing to a book 
entitled The Hitler We Love and Wht3 and distributing a tract entitled Did 
Six Million Really Die?,34 which claimed that the Holocaust was in fact a 
Zionist swindle.3s He was charged with violating a little-used portion of 
the Canadian criminal code prohibiting the publication of false statements 
"likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest.,,36 He was also fea-
tured on CBS' top-rated television program 60-Minutes.37 The case be-
came, in effect, an international symposium on the Holocaust denial 
movement.38 
Irving is a prominently controversial English historian39 whose recent 
:zs See Doreen Carvajal, Extremist Institute Mired in Power Struggle, L.A. nMEs, May 15, 1994, 
at A3. Carta bad already organized the Liberty Lobby, a Washington-based group considered to be one 
of the most active anti-Semitic organizations in the countty.ld. 
29 See LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 185; ADL Report Reveals Split in Holocaust Deniol Movement 
that is as Hateful as Their Anti-Semitic Propaganda, Business Wue, availDble in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, BW File; News Brief, HOUSTON OmON., Jan. 25, 1992, at A12; see also infra Part I.B.3. 
JO ARTIIUR Burz, THE HOAX OF mE TwENnEnI CENTuRy (Noontide Press 1976). Noontide 
Press and the Institute for Historical Review are closely related. See LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 152-
53; see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1296 (Bork, J.) (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (describing the relationship as the "Liberty Lobby/Legionl NoontidellllR network"). Professor 
Butt is a tenured professor of electrical engineering at Northwestern. 
" PAUL RAsSINIER, DEBUNKING mE GENOCIDE MYIH (Noontide Press 1978); see LlPsTADT, note 
13, at 51-64. 
32 See Prokop, supra note 19, at 2564; LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 123-36, 51-65. 
33 CmuSTOFF FRIEDRICH & ERIc THoMSON,nm HrIulR WE LoVED AND WHY (White Power 
1977); see LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 157-58. 
34 RICHARD HARWOOD, DID SIX Mn.uON REAlLy DIE? (1974). "Richard Harwood" was a 
pseudonym for Richard Verrall, the editor of Spearhood, a neofascist publication. See LlPsTADT, supra 
note 13, at 104. 
35 See LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 157-59. 
36 See Douglas, supra note II, at 478 {citing R.S.C., ch. C-34, § In (l970) {Can.}}. Zundel's 
conviction was overturned on appeal. See infra notes 293-98 and accompanying texL 
37 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 27, 1994). 
38 See Irwin Cotler (quoted in Debate, supra 2, at 564). 
39 See ADL Background Information on Holocaust Denier David Irving, U.S. Newswire, June 4, 
1996, availDble in LEXIS, Nexis Library, USNWR File [hereinafter ADL Background Information]. 
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biography of Nazi propagandist Josef Goebbels suggests that Hitler was not 
personally responsible for the Holocaust.«I As far back as 1959 he was an-
nouncing his admiration of the Nazi regime in World War II Gennany and 
claiming that the British press was "owned by Jews.'o4· His most famous 
book, Hitler's War,42 argued that Hitler neither ordered nor even knew 
about the genocidal policy known as the "Pinal Solution. ,043 In the ensuing 
years, Irving has made numerous speaking appearances before the 
aforementioned Institute for Historical Review, shared a platform with Ku 
Klux Klan member and neo-Nazi David Duke, and testified for the defense 
at Zundel's 1988 trial.44 In 1989, responding to Russia's publication of a 
list of over 74,000 Auschwitz victims, Irving asserted that there were no gas 
chambers or master plan: "It's just a myth and at last the myth is being 
eroded .... Eyewitness evidence is a problem for psychiatrists.'t4.5 
Garaudy is a well-known French author who has made a career of 
denouncing what he calls Jewish "Shoah business.'t46 His most recent 
book, The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics, claims that Israel has exploit-
ed the Holocaust to put itself above all intemationallaw.47 
Nowhere is the tension between the quest for truth and free speech 
greater than at university libraries, which like their public-library counter-
parts have difficulty distinguishing between legitimate Holocaust literature 
and the distortions of Holocaust denial. 
The experience at Texas A&M University is illustrative. David 
Gershom Myers, an associate professor of English, was disturbed to 
discover that at least ten Holocaust-denial books were classified in the 
.. See ill . 
.. Id. 
42 OAVID IRVING, Hrn.ER's WAR (1977). 
4J See ADL Background Information, supra note 39. John Lukacs wrote in the National Review 
that Hitler's War contained "hundreds of errors: wrong names, wrong dates, and ••• statements about 
events that did not really take place. These errors ... are not the result of inadequate research [or] 
technical mistakes or oversights. They are the result of the dominant tendency of the author's mind." 
John Lukacs, Book Review, NAT'L REv., Aug. 19, 1977, at46.lrving's 1987 diatribe, Churchill's War, 
may have been his most crudely anti-Jewish work. See ADL Background Information, supra note 39. 
.. See ADL Background Information, supra note 39. On the witness stand for Zundel, Irving 
stated that he had found "no document whatsoever indicating the Holocaust occurred." Id. In Apri1 of 
1990 he was quoted as saying that "the holocaust of the Gennans of Dresden was real. The holocaust 
of the Jews in the Auschwitz gas chambers is a fabrication." Id. 
., Id . 
.. 8arry James, Cleric Draws Rebuke by Anti-Racists, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 2, 1996, at 
News 1; see also A Land Stained With Guilty Secrets, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 9, 1997, at 21; 
Douglas Johnson, French Historions and the Holocaust, HISTORY TODAY, Oct. 1996, at 2; Julian 
Nundy, Mystifying Dawnfall: Onetime Hero's New Beliefs Embarrass Fra1lCe, NEWSDAY, May 29, 
1996, at 83; With Both Eyes on the HUI1IQ1I Condition, FINANCIAL TIMEs (London), June 21, 1997, at 
4. Shoah is the Hebrew word for Holocaust 
., ROGER GARAUDY, THE foUNDING MY11iS OP IsRAEU Pouncs (1996); see also Nundy, supra 
note 46, at 83. 
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university's main library under Holocaust, Jewish History.48 Fearful that 
Holocaust denial passed off as scholarship will become increasingly 
prevalent as survivors die and time passes, Myers argued that such books 
do not deserve the imprimatur of credibility suggested by inclusion in a 
university or public library.49 He sought to have them removed altogether 
or at least taken out of general circulation, but succeeded only in getting 
them placed in a different sub-category called Errors and Inventions. 
But Myers dso has evoked criticism from academics around the 
country who argue that any suppression of books is wrong, no matter how 
repugnant their message. so Where can the line be drawn, they ask. Such 
censorship of material containing offensive or unpopular ideas interferes 
with the education of students; it sets a bad example.sl The proper role of 
the university is to engrain critical thinking. 52 
Myers counters by arguing that an engineering professor would not 
tolerate a book advocating unsound construction practices that would cause 
bridges to collapse.s3 Holocaust denial, he argues, is just as dangerous.54 
"Survivors are going to die and we are their heirs. If we don't protect their 
memory, no one will. ,,55 
Others sympathize with Myer's view but would not remove the 
offensive books-because they can be used to research anti-Semitism.S6 
But all fmd it unacceptable that an innocent student could discover denial 
books classified under Holocaust.57 
Holocaust revisionists have been most successful in gaining access to 
a respectable press in France, where they have managed to entangle 
academic historians in debate.s8 In 1985 the University of Nantes awarded 
a doctorate (with honors) to a sixty-five-year-old agronomist for a 371-page 
thesis that asserted there was no fmn evidence to prove that the Nazis had 
gassed prisoners in concentration camps.S9 But in Germany, the doctorate 
.. See Mary Ann Roser, AclM Professor Stirs Debate Over Holocaust Denial Booles, AUSTIN-AM. 
STATESMAN, Apr. 10, 1996, at B1. 
.. See ill. 
so See ill. 
s, See ill. 
S> See ill. 
S) See ill. 
S4 See id. 
ss [d. 
S6 See id. 
S7 See ill. Even more confusing may be the fictionalized accounts of the Holocaust. For a defense 
of their utility, see Douglas, supra note 11. 
sa See Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the 
'Auschwitz'~ Other-'Lies: 85 MICH. L. REv. 277, 280 nn.9-11 (1986) (citing PIERRE VIDA-
NAQUET, Theses sur Ie Revisionnisme, in L' AuEMAGNE NAZIE ET LE GENOCIDE IUIF 496,505 (1985». 
S9 See ill. at 280 n.ll. The paper provoked a storm of protests, and the French government 
ordered the doctorate be withdrawn because of improprieties in the examining process. [d.; see also 
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of a seventy-year-old fonner judge was revoked in 1983 on the ground that 
he had authored a book entitled The Auschwitz Myth-Legend or Reality, 
which questioned the death of six million Jews.60 And in Switzerland, a 
high-school teacher and military judge in the Swiss anny who questioned 
the existence of Nazi gas chambers in World War II was fonnally barred 
from teaching history. 61 
3. Newspapers62 
Over the past decade, the most pressing journalistic decisions facing 
college or university newspapers have involved the controversial question 
of whether to publish a paid advertisement denying the existence of the 
Holocaust.63 Most of these advertisements are promulgated and paid for by 
the aforementioned Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust, which 
claims to encourage scholarly discussion about the Holocaust.64 
The Committee is spearheaded by the aforementioned Bradley Smith, 
a self-employed businessman with no fonnal historic training.65 Smith's 
advertisement/essays, written in reasonably well-constructed scholarly prose, 
question the historical legitimacy of various facets of the Holocaust-such 
as the existence of death-camp crematoria, the number of Jews actually 
killed, indeed the Nazis' very policy of genocide.66 
Smith has succeeded in placing advertisements in roughly half of the 
campus newspapers to which he has submitted them.67 Most of the editors 
choosing to publish defended their decisions broadly on First Amendment 
grounds (freedom of speech and press), many of them noting specifically 
their aversion to censorship.68 Those choosing not to publish argue that the 
proffered material is patently false69 and amounts to nothing more than 
France Revokes Thesis That Denies Nazi Acts, N.Y. TiMFs,luly 3, 1986, at A2; Frenchman Assailed 
for Denying Nazi Crimes, N.Y. TiMFs, June 13, 1986, at A4. 
60 See Stein, supra note 58, at 280 n.ll . 
• , See Swiss Doubter of Nazi Camps Is Forbidden to Teach History, N.Y. TiMFs, Feb. 22, 1987, 
at AIO. 
62 See generally LiPsTADT, supra note 13, at 183-208. 
63 See Bob Keeler, Assault on History, NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 1994, at 68 . 
.. See LiPsTADT, supra note 13, at 183-208; Leon leroff, Debating the Holocaust, nME, Dec. 27, 
1993, at 83. 
05 See Dimitry Nemirovsky, That Ad Shouldn't Have Run, WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 1992, at A15. 
.. See leroff, supra note 64, at 83. Smith has also been associated with the Populist Party (which 
ran David Duke for president in 1988) and the Liberty Party. See Nemirovsky, supra note 65, at A15 . 
• , See LIPSTADT, supra note 13, at 184; see generally lohn Fernandez, Holocaust Ad in UM paper 
Costs $2 Million Donation, PALM BEACH PosT, Apr. 13,1994, at IA . 
.. See LIPSTADT, supra note 13, at 189-94; see also infra Pan I.B.3.a. 
69 See Michael Kenney, The Holocaust and the Politics of Denial, B. GLOBE, Aug. 12, 1993, at 
62. 
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thinly-disguised racial hatred,70 and that the First Amendment does not 
require any newspaper to publish any article, editorial or advertisement 
submitted.lI 
For his part, Smith claims that he has been blacklisted by the media. 
"The Holocaust story," he declares, "is closed to free inquiry in our 
universities and among intellectuals.,,72 His message is not one of hate, he 
says, but of "intellectual freedom.,,73 He has thus turned his efforts from 
campus newspapers to the World Wide Web.74 . 
a. Choosing to Publish 
At Duke University (a private institution), the student newspaper, the 
Duke Chronicle, published Smith's message in full, without factual rebut-
tal.7S Instead, a column by the editor-in-chief reasoned that by printing the 
advertisement the newspaper was protecting the author's First Amendment 
rights.76 "The argument for Holocaust revisionism is a political stance that 
is not widely known," the editor wrote, "perhaps because it is so offensive 
to Jewish people as well as many others.,,77 In addition, the editorial 
described Bradley Smith's work as "reinterpreting history, a practice that 
occurs constantly on a college campus.'t7B When challenged by other stu-
dents, the editors vehemently stood by their decision, explaining that while 
they adhere to a clear policy of rejecting "racially or ethnically slurring" 
advertisements, denying the Holocaust and espousing Zionist-conspiracy 
theory is not necessarily anti-Semitic.79 The same editors said they rejected 
an ad from Playboy magazine for reasons of taste, and one from a sorority 
because it appeared libelous.so 
As a private university which funds the student newspaper, Duke could 
have prohibited the Duke Chronicle from publishing Bradley Smith's 
material. However, the school had already ceded complete editorial control 
over the Duke Chronicle to its student editors. Moreover, Duke's president 
said that to have "suppressed" the advertisement would have gone against 
70 See ill; see also LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 208. 
71 See Kenney, supra note 69, at 62; see also LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 194. 
13 Beck, supra note 12, at AI. 
13 [d. 
74 See ill. 
" See Nemirovsky, supra note 65, at A1S. 
7. See LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 191-92 (referring to DUKE CHRONICLE, Nov. 5, 1991, at 9). 
77 [d. 
71 [d.; see Nemirovsky, supra note 65, at A1S. Smith was so pleased with the Duke Chronicle's 
editorial response that be distributed copies of the editor-in-chief's column. [d. 
79 Nemirovsky, supra note 65, at A1S. 
80 See LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 196 (citing DUKE CHRONICLE, Nov. 7, 1991, at 1,3). 
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the University's "long tradition of supporting First Amendment rights."SI 
The school's history department apparently disagreed, submitting an 
advertisement of its own that argued that the editors of the Duke Chronicle 
had been "suckered by scholarly prose" into publishing such falsities.82 
At Brandeis, a private university, editors of The Justice published the 
Holocaust-denial advertisement ostensibly to inform readers that such 
thinking exists.83 While a minority of editors voted to reject the advertise-
ment because it was blatantly false and offensive,s4 the majority defended 
their decision on free speech grounds. as In protest of the editors' decision 
to publish the advertisement, students reacted by stealing several thousand 
copies of The Justice.8fJ 
The administration at Brandeis gives editors of The Justice free 
editorial discretion without consistent faculty supervision.87 The newspaper 
received further support from the president of Brandeis, who issued a state-
ment declaring the right of the student editors to make their own judgments 
about content. "I strongly disagree with their decision to run the ad ... 
[but] [t]he principle of free speech applies to editorial content of newspa-
pers and other medias."88 
The student newspaper of the private University of Miami, The 
Hurricane, stirred up similar controversy when it published one of Smith's 
advertisements. The brouhaha spilled over to the alumni-one of whom 
threatened to withdraw a $2 million donation if the school failed to repudi-
ate such publications.89 The Hurricane's editor said that she ran the ad-
vertisement to educate readers on an alternative view of the Holocaust.90 
Miami's president cited the newspaper's constitutional right to freedom of 
the press.91 Two weeks after the advertisement appeared, Miami's board of 
trustees met to do what it could to keep "hateful and misleading advertise-
81 Id. 
82 Jeff Ristiner, Ad Questioning Holocaust Takes Aim at Students, SAN DIEOO UNION-TRIBUNE, 
Jan. II, 1992, at AI. 
8l See Studellts Protest Ad Disputing Holocaust, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), Dec. 11, 1993, 
at A9. 
84 See Brandeis Studellts Publish Ad Calling Holocaust a Hoax, DEs MOINES REG., Dec. 29, 
1993, at 3. 
115 See Editorial, Advertising Hate, B. GLOBE, Dec. 14, 1993, at 26. 
86 See Brandeis Roiled by Holocaust Ad, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1993, § I (Magazine), at 43. 
While Brandeis' President, Samuel O. Their, sympathized with the protesters, be supported The 
Justice's decision and condemned the acts of the protestors on the principle of free speech.ld. 
81 See Samuel O. Their, Editorial, Holocaust Deniers Got More Than Visibility, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 
23, 1993, at A16. 
88 Id. 
89 See Fernandez, supra note 67, at lA . 
.. See id. 
91 See id. 
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ments" out of the student newspaper.92 "Extrapolating the administration's 
defInition of freedom of speech." said one observer. "would compel Boy's 
Life magazine to print ads for ... an organization of pedophiles. ,,93 
At the University of Michigan. a public institution. the editors of the 
Michigan Daily published the Holocaust-denial advertisement by mistake.94 
The paper offered an apology.9S In a separate column. however. the editor-
in-chief defended its appearance on First Amendment grounds. writing "the 
reason that we have free speech is that we can argue things and fmd the 
truth:t96 That position echoed a statement by Michigan's president. who 
noted The Daily's long history of editorial freedom. which he said must be 
protected even when "we disagree ... with particular opinions. decisions or 
actions.·..., 
A contrary administrative response occurred when the University of 
Central Florida's (UCF) student newspaper published an advertisement 
questioning whether gas chambers were used in Nazi concentration 
camps.98 A UCF spokesman said "[t]he First Amendment does not confer 
a requirement that any newspaper publish any ad that it receives.'t99 Be-
cause UCF is a state university. it could not constitutionally restrict the 
newspaper's First Amendment right to freedom of the press without a 
fmding that such material would substantially interfere with the educational 
process. 100 
A similar reaction came from Ohio State University's president. who 
attacked his school paper's decision to print a Smith advertisement by 
declaring Smith's arguments to be "pernicious" and "cleverly disguised" 
propaganda that distorted history. 101 
Although Rutgers' student newspaper. The Daily Targum. rejected the 
Holocaust tract as an advertisement. it ran the proffered material in its news 
section with an accompanying editorial condemning such falsities and ideas 
of hatred.'02 Wrote the editor-in-chief: "We ran the ad ... because you 
92 UM Officials Say They Won't Censor Paper, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 27,1994, at D3. 
OJ Sasser, supra note 20, at 14 . 
.. See LiPsTADT, supra note 13, at 189 (referring to MIcmGAN DAn-Y, Oct 24, 1991) . 
., See ill. at 189-90 (citing to MIcmGAN DAn-Y, Oct 25, 1991). 
96 [d. 
97 [d. at 191. In a similar situation, the University of Notre Dame's student newspaper, The 
Observer, also claimed that the Holocaust-denial advertisement was published by accident when a clerk 
failed to check it for controversial content The Observer's editor-in-chief said that the advertisement 
would not have passed with his approval had he been aware of its existence. See Heather Harlan, 
HoloctJllSt Ad Leads to Campus Protests, N.Y. TiMES, Ian. 9, 1994, at 4A. 
91 See Tom Leithauser, UCF Criticizes Student Paper Over Holocaust Ad, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Apr. 14, 1994, at Cl. 
99 [d. 
'00 See id. 
101 LiPsTADT, supra note 13, at 194 (citing OIDO STATE LANTERN,lan. 24, 1992, at 8). 
102 See LiPsTADT, supra note 13, at 200 (referring to RUl'GERS DAn-Y TARGUM, Dec. 3, 1991, at 
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cannot fight the devil you cannot see."I03 
Holocaust-denial advertisements were also submitted to five Ivy 
League schools, but only The Cornell Daily Sun chose to publish.I04 Said 
the editors: "We believe it is not our role to unjustly censor advertisers' 
viewpoints. Although we are offended by the ad, we decided to print it. The 
Sun believes that the First Amendment right to free expression must be 
extended to those with unpopular or offensive ideas."los 
b. Choosing to Reject 
Mter two years of controversy over whether to accept a Holocaust-
denial advertisement,l06 the public University of Texas' Daily Texan 
decided not to publish.l07 Those who supported a decision to publish cited 
the right to a free press and the right for a person, even hatemongers, to 
express their views. lOS Those who opposed publication of the advertise-
ment argued that the newspaper has a First Amendment right to set stan-
dards for all advertisements, and should reject those that violate such stan-
dards.109 In fact, the policy handbook of the Daily Texan forbids the pub-
lishing of advertisements which attack racial, religious or sexual groupS.IIO 
The editors of The Spectrum, the University of Buffalo's student 
newspaper, refused to publish a Holocaust-denial advertisement on the 
grounds that the newspaper had a right to reject anything it deemed unfit, 
and that this type of advertisement fell into that category. III The 
Spectrum's business manager said that she found the advertisement to be 
offensive and "didn't feel it was worth any dollars."112 
The Dartmouth Review justified its decision not to publish by arguing 
'that an editor has the right to choose ads based on "decency" and "accura-
10). 
103 Id. 
104 See LIPSTADT, supra note 13, at 192 (referring to CORNElL DAILY SUN, Nov. 18, 1991, at 20); 
see also Holocaust Ad at Cornell U. Stirs a Protest, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1991, at B6. 
10> LIPSTADT, supra note 13, at 192 (citing to CORNElL DAILY SUN, Nov. 18, 1991, at 1). 
106 See Todd Ackennan, UT Board against Flip·flops, Rejects Holocaust Ad, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 
30, 1992, at A18. 
107 See Mark E. Wise & Barbara B. Harberg, Editorial, Stop Spreading Hatred, HOus. CHRON., 
Feb. 28, 1993, at A13. The decision was made by the Texas Student Publications Board comprised of 
six students, three faculty members and two working journalists. See Todd Ackennan, Ad Doubting 
Holocaust History Is OK'd at UT, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 27, 1991, at A13. 
lOB See Fernando Dovalina, UTs Daily Texan Putting Muule on Free Speech?, Hous. CHRON., 
May 17, 1992, at 4. 
109 See id. 
110 TExAs STUDENT PuBUCATIONS, HANDBOOK OF OPERATING PROCEDURES 'I F.8 (Jan. 1992). 
III See Karen Brady, VB Newspaper Bars Ad Calling Holocaust a Lie, BUFf. NEWS, Apr. 15, 
1994, at Local Page. 
112 Id. 
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cy.,,113 
Similarly, the editor-in-chief of The Daily Pennsylvanian, the Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania's student newspaper, refused to run the advertisement on 
the grounds that it portrays something "we know to be false." 11 4 
Other prestigious university papers as well refused to publish the 
advertisement. The Harvard Crimson declined to provide a forum for 
"malicious falsehoods" in the guise of open debate. lIS The University of 
Chicago's Maroon declared that it had no obligation to print "offensive 
hatred.,,116 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Tech stated its 
policy of rejecting material which it knew "did not tell the truth.,,117 
Brown University's Daily Herald turned down Smith's essay for its "vi-
cious antisemitic lies" parading as "history and scholarship.,,118 The Uni-
versity of California at Santa Barbara's Daily Nexus refused to print the ad 
because of its "blatant distortion of the truth. ,,119 
C. Holocaust Denial and Political Correctness 
Political correctness may be on the run in the pop culture of talk radio, 
but it is no laughing matter in the Ivory Tower. Though scarcely reported 
by the media, hundreds of American colleges and universities-from the 
backwoods of Appalachia to the august quadrangles of Ivy League law 
schools-are currently engaged in an entrenched battle over both the nature 
of the standard curriculum and the freedom of speech on campus. l20 
Fifty years ago, when the Holocaust was fresh and searing, the 
bramble-bush of political correctness was mere stubble in the wasteland of 
academic politics. Now universities are pushing various political correctness 
agendas by way of curricular reform and the promulgation of speech and 
conduct codes. Orthodoxies of all kinds are being challenged. Eurocentric 
doctrine (including that of modern Jewish history) is subjected to 
"deconstruction," with the underlying theory that all opinions are valid. 
Facts are said to be nothing more than received opinions. This phenomenon 
113 Ruth Rosen, Hate Ads and Free Speech JoU17Ul1s Don't Have to Accommodate Groups that 
Deny the Holocaust, CHRIsTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 16, 1992, at 19. 
114 Michael Matza, Anti-Holocaust Ad Fuels Campus Fury: Debate Rages Over Decision at 
Brandeis, REcoRD (N. NJ.), Dec. 29, 1993, at BS. 
'" Kenney, supra note 69, at 62. 
116 Deborah Lipstadt, False 'Reasoning' on the Holocaust, NEWSDAY, July 26, 1993, at 35. 
117 [d. 
118 Howard Kleinberg, Holocaust Denial: A New Form 0/ Hate Propoganda, DAYTON DAILY 
NEWS, Dec. 15, 1993, at 19A. 
119 Yale also declined to print the advertisement in question. LlPsTADT, supra note 13, at 199. 
'lD See Jenish D'Arcy & William Lowther, War o/Words: Academics Clash Over 'Correctness,' 
MAcLEAN's, May 27, 1991, at 44. 
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has enabled Holocaust deniers to elevate their cause into the realm of 
academic debate. 
Thus when American adults were asked in 1993 if they thought it 
possible that the Holocaust never really ever happened, twenty percent of 
them answered in the affIrmative.121 
Such a response is not the concern of constitutional scholars, whose 
abiding interest in political correctness has always been the stifling effect on 
civil liberties and academic freedom of the restrictive speech- and conduct-
codes that have become commonplace in the Ivory Tower.lll Even though 
not one such code has been able to withstand constitutional scrutiny, both 
students and professors (as well as administrators) look and listen nervously 
over their shoulders for fear of offending mushrooming numbers of special-
interest groups. 123 
What the Founding Fathers envisioned as vigorous disagreement in a 
free and open marketplace of ideas-even if some of those thoughts are 
abhorrent to the civil temperament-has been quashed at the very places 
such debates are supposed to occur most freely. 124 What should be one of 
the richest and most receptive places of honest intellectual inquiry and 
discourse has instead become one of the most intolerant. 
The Academy has become a decidedly unwelcome nesting place for 
people with traditional points of view or ways of presenting them. What 
were once noble and defensible goals-intellectual curiosity and sensitivity 
toward others-have been forged into bludgeons of moral imperatives.l25 
The pervasive atmosphere of the political correctness current in the 
Academy today complicates the question of Holocaust revisionism. In 
121 See Lipstadt, False ReasorUng, supra note 116, at 61. A similar question posed in France and 
Britain elicited "yes" from seven percent Id. 
122 See Robert Hawkins, Some Imprints Left as 1991 Fades . .. Art-Censorship Battles Loom as 
Pressure Increasing From All Viewpoints, SAN DIEGO UNION-1'RIB., Dec. 27, 1991, at CI. 
123 See generally Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds 
and Manners, 63 TENN. L. REv. 689 (1996). The pernicious nature of political correctness is most 
clearly revealed by the absurd extremes encouraged by some campus conduct codes. Though many of 
them have never been tested in court and continue to be broadly implemented-some to the destruction 
of careers and reputations-not one of them to date has been found constitutional. 
124 See Stephen Reese & John D.H. Downing, Holocaust Ad Poisons Public Debate, AUSTIN-AM. 
STATESMAN, May 1. 1992, at 1. 
12> The rules regarding harassment have iced over into the ftrst icy patch on the slippery slope to 
repression of unpopular ideas. They deter not only genuine misconduct but also harmless (and even 
desirable) speech. which in higher education is central both to the purpose of the institution and to the 
employee's profession and performance. Legislative remedies should not be necessary. but they are. In 
1993 California saw ftt to enact a new law guaranteeing "student[s] ... the same right to exercise 
[their] free speech on campus as [they] enjoy when off campus." CAL. [Schools and School Districts] 
CODE § 4(b) (West 1997). 
The clear line to be drawn between academic freedom and actionable harassment is the same as 
that between speech and conduct The fonner is almost always protected by the First Amendment, the 
latter can be constitutionally proscribed. 
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seeking to challenge traditional culture, the guardians of political correct-
ness have been tellingly inconsistent. While they would be quick to con-
demn an historian who denied the evils of slavery, they have been reluctant 
to spurn Holocaust denial. Perhaps this is because their agenda is essentially 
anti-Western, -white, and -Imperialistic; Jews are not viewed as an endan-
gered minority; Zionism is seen not as a liberation movement, but as 
racism. 
Pressure to be politically correct has generated a back1ash against 
political correctness as well. The combination of the two has had an 
unsettling effect on student editors. Can those who would voice alarm at the 
modern political correctness movement's exclusion of Eurocentric culture at 
the same time call for exclusion of revisionists and deniers? Students might 
fmd it difficult to condemn both the excesses of political correctness and 
the promulgation of Holocaust -denial literature. 
Here, after all, is where two principles-the freedom of speech in the 
quest for truth, and the suppression of racism in the quest for equality-are 
sometimes in conflict. 
It is not always easy to discern the difference between historical fact 
and biased opinion. When that opinion is couched in the academic voice, 
and aimed at students who were not alive when the events of World War II 
were occurring, the confusion becomes palpable. 126 
At least part of the increasing academic respectability of Holocaust 
denial can thus be traced to the political correctness controversy. "The 
politically correct line on the Holocaust story," urge people like Bradley 
Smith, "is, simply, it happened. You don't debate it.,,127 The predictable 
reaction of politically incorrect people is to debate it. 
When campus newspapers begin to do that, however, they render 
Holocaust denial a matter of opinion rather than a matter of fact. Editorial 
boards invoke the First Amendment to support their decisions. Although 
some universities argue that this has nothing to do with free speech, few 
cite the express policy of most campus newspapers not to run racist, sexist, 
or religiously offensive advertisements. 
The anti-Semitic motivation of Holocaust deniers becomes clear when 
viewed in the very limited context of their revisionism: none of them would 
deny that the Second World War or even specific battles happened. It is 
thus all the more bizarre (and dangerous) for politically correct campuses to 
give safe haven to Holocaust deniers-and make their cause a free-speech 
issue at that. 128 
'26 See Julia Neuberger, A Brie/History o/the Wicketkst Lie 0/ All, LoNDON nMEs, May 4, 1995, 
at Features 1. 
127 Kenney, supra note 69, at 62. 
'211 See id. 
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Another aspect of political correctness that affects recognition of the 
Holocaust is its tendency to view events in relative and subjective tenns. 
Thus when the Holocaust is portrayed as just another example of man's 
inhumanity to man-and perceived solely in the context of other social 
dilemmas such as abortion, child abuse, discrimination against homosexuals, 
and domestic violence-its impact as a unique atrocity is minimalized.129 
Likewise, the politically correct inclination is to downplay (or deny) 
the dark and brutal sides of life and to emphasize the saving powers of 
individual and collective morality .130 Thus events are more often portrayed 
as uplifting human triumphs over adversity than as tragedies (witness The 
Diary oj Anne Frank), 131 and it seems to have become a more palatable 
proclivity to celebrate survivors and rescuers than to dwell on mourning 
victims (witness Schindler's List).132 
Often overlooked in the wars of words on American campuses is that 
there are other ways for universities to combat the problem of hateful and 
bigoted speech-strategies that do not interfere with students' or professors' 
constitutionally protected rights.133 All educational institutions (both public 
and private), for that matter, should teach civility and tolerance along with 
history and scientific method. All should lead by example. 
What example can be made of Holocaust denial? 
n. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. or of 
the press. 
- United States Constitution'14 
If by the liberty of the press. we understand merely the liberty of dis-
cussing the propriety of public measures and political opinions. let us have as 
much of it as you please; but. if it means the liberty of affronting. calum-
niating. and defaming one another. I own myself willing to part with my share 
of it whenever our legislators shall please to alter the law; and shall cheerfully 
119 See Alvin H. Rosenfeld, The Americanizlltion of the Holocaust, COMMENTARY, June I, 1995, 
at 35, 36. Ironically, the concept that the Holocaust was unique has been diminished by both the United 
States Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., and the Simon Wiesentha1 Center's Museum of 
Tolerance in Los Angeles. The Holocaust Museum's ultimate goal is an "en masse understanding that 
we are not about what the Germans did to Jews but what people did to people." [d. The Museum of 
Tolerance situates the Holocaust within a historical framework that includes such non-genocidal social 
problems as the Los Angeles riots and the struggle for black civil rights. See ill. 
1JO See ill. at 37. 
III See ill. 
132 See ide at 38. 
III See infra Part n.A.2.-3. 
134 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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consent to exclumge my liberty of abusing others for the privilege of not being 
abused myself. 
- Benjamin Franklin l 3.5 
A. Principles of Liberty 
53 
Ben Franklin's view may have been civil and proper, but the Founding 
Fathers were motivated by a much more libertarian philosophy when they 
drafted the Bill of Rights. l36 The First Amendment not only protects the 
media from government interference, but grants the press almost absolute 
power to print whatever it wishes. Freedom of the press, often characterized 
as "the mother of all our liberties,"137 had "little or nothing to do with 
truth-telling .... Most of the early newspapers were partisan sheets devoted 
to attacks on political opponents .... ,,138 Back then, freedom of the press 
meant "the right to be just or unjust, partisan or non-partisan, true or false, 
in news column or editorial column."139 That same freedom also allows 
newspapers to reject any matter, editorial or advertising. 
1. The Intent of the Framers1«1 
Constitutional interpretation often begins with speculation about the 
intent of the Founding Fathers. As to the First Amendment, much has been 
made of Thomas Jefferson's libertarian perspective on free speech: that the 
best way to deal with error is to permit its correction by truth. 141 "The bar 
of public reason,"142 said Jefferson, will generally provide the remedy for 
I" Benjamin Franklin, FEDERAL GAZE'ITE (phil.), Sepl 12, 1789, at 2. 
1)6 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modem Interpretations, 28 
WM. & MARy L. REv. 439, 457-58 (1987). 
131 4 ADLAI E. STEVENSON, The One-Party Press, in THE PAPERS OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON 75, 78 
(Walter Johnson ed., 1974) ("The free press is the mother of all our liberties and of our progress under 
liberty."); see also JUNIUS, Dedication to the English Nation, in THE LETrERs OF JUNIUS 7, 8-9 (John 
Cannon ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1TI2) (''Let it be impressed upon your minds,let it be instilled 
into your children, that the liberty of the press is the palladium of all the civil, political, and religious 
rights .... "); Edmund Randolph, Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia, reprinted in 44 VA. 
MAG. OF HIsT. & BIOGRAPHY 43, 46 (1936) (stating that freedom of the press was one of "the fruits 
of genuine democracy and historical experience"). 
'38 CHARLEs BEARD, ST. loUIS PosT-DISPATCH SYMPOSIUM ON FREEDoM OF TIlE PREss 13 
(1938) (quoted in CoMMISSION ON FREEDoM OF THE PREss, A FREE AND REsPONSmLE PREss 131 
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1947». 
1)9 Id. 
1«1 1be ideas expressed in this section were originally presented in Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel 
Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt In, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 77, 97-101 (1984). 
,., See, e.g., W.O. DoUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LmERTY 362 (1954); DAVID N. MAYER, THE 
CoNSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THoMAS JEFFERSON 166-84 (Univ. Press of Virgo 1994). 
'42 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THE LIFE AND SELECIlID WRfT-
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abuses occasioned by the unfettered dissemination of infonnation. Only 
when security and peace are threatened should the discussion of political, 
economic, and social affairs be restrained.143 James Madison, often called 
the architect of the Bill of Rights, thought likewise: freedom of speech and 
press, he wrote in The Federalist, would engender a reasoned citizen-
ry-that would in tum keep the government in check.l44 
It can also be argued that the Framers would not have wanted to 
protect racial defamation, which deliberately exacerbates group tensions and 
plays negatively upon the heterogeneous, pluralistic character of American 
society.14s The goal of casting contempt on an ethnic group is not to 
participate in political debate founded on the principle of pluralism~ but to 
destroy it. In this sense, racial defamation is subversive speech. Unlike 
political extremism, in which, (however distorted its form) the Framers' 
principle of self-government is evident, the principle underlying racial 
defamation is pure-form discrimination.l46 
Other historians, however, conclude that there was no clear "intent" 
underlying the First Amendment.147 Rather, the Framers perceived issues 
of individual rights as concerns to be addressed not by the newly estab-
lished general government, but by the respective stateS.I48 In fact not all 
freedoms were easly recognized by the drafters of the Constitution. On the 
fmal day of the constitutional convention, for example, a provision that "the 
liberty of the Press should inviolably be observed" was proposed but was 
promptly voted down because (said the delegates) "[iJt is unnecessary-tbe 
power of Congress does not extend to the PreSS.,,149 Eventually, say some 
historians, the Bill of Rights was adopted less as an additional guarantor of 
INGS OF lliOMAS JEFFERSON 2m, 300 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1993). 
'43 See DoUGLAS, supra note 141, at 362. Justice Douglas naturally interpreted Jefferson's 
meaning as in accord with his own 'absolutist' stance. But the argument made by the state in favor of 
any given abridgment of speech is always that social peace and security is being threatened. 
'44 John Fmnis, "Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Ob-
scenity, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 229 (1967). 
'45 The stirring up of racial or ethnic "fears, hate, guilt and greed" is fundamentally opposed to the 
Framer's intent to ensure cooperative social pluralism. DERRICK A. BEll., RACISM IN AMERICAN LAw 
59 (1973). 
'46 The positive intent of the Framers to found a nation based on pluralism should not, therefore, 
be distorted to tolerate the free rein of vindictive attack which is unrelated, except in appearance, to 
any constitutional or national purpose. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. EPsTEIN & ARNOLD FoRSTER, THE 
RADICAL RIGHT 40 (1967); Brendan F. Brown, Racialism and the Rights of Nations, 21 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. I, 13 (1945). Note also that invidious racial and ethnic discrimination has been rejected as 
antithetical to American national policy. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
'47 See JAMES MAcGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 60-62 (1982); Lillian R. BeVier, 
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the SubstanCe and limits of Principle, 30 
STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978); Franklyn S. Haiman, How Much of Our Speech Is Free?, 2 CiV. LIB. REv. 
111, 113 (1975). 
'48 See BURNS, supra note 147, at 539-40. 
'49 Id. at 62. 
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libertylSO than as a bargaining chip to procure state ratification.ISI 
Thus one should not expect that understanding the intent of the 
Framers will resolve the question of precisely what they sought to protect 
by the First Amendment. There appears to have been no extensive, carefully 
considered debate on the subject of individual freedom. 
For some constitutional scholars, the principle of self-government 
sufficiently identifies the parameters of the First Amendment: Congress is 
forbidden from abridging the freedom of a citizen's speech whenever it has 
anything to do with political, economic, and social issues. ls2 Put more 
succinctly, the Founding Fathers envisioned "the free and robust exchange 
of ideas and political debate."1S3 The federal-state system of checks and 
balances was devised to prevent government tyranny.lS4 Similarly, the 
various guarantees of the Bill of Rights effectively prevent a "tyranny of 
opinion" from being concentrated in anyone institution or person, and serve 
to ensure social, political, and religious pluralism; it should be virtually 
impossible for popular self-government to be defeated by consolidation of 
control.ISS The Framers may have perceived government to be a necessary 
evil,l56 but it is probably more accurate to suggest that they drafted the 
Constitution to make the cooperation of competing interests the price for 
protecting the liberty of each.ls7 The guarantee of free speech enabled the 
citizens to express their will to a representative government. IS8 
,..., Jefferson, supra note 142, at 403, 405 (quoting from a letter to James Madison, Dec. 20,1787, 
"a bill of rights is wbat the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or 
particular" (emphasis added». 
'51 See BURNS, supra note 147, at 542-43; see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment 
is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr. REv. 245, 264. 
'52 See Meiklejohn, supra note 151, at 255. To Meiklejohn the goal appears to be the acquisition 
by voters of "intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare"--a 
weighty purpose indeed for speech to play.ld. 
,>:I Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973); see also Finnis, supra note 144, at 238. 
'54 See BURNS, supra note 147, at 60-61. 
I5S See ill. 
,,. See PETER USTINOV, My RUSSIA 204, 209 (1983). 
IS1 It can also be argued that the Framers would not have wanted to protect racial defamation, 
which deliberately exacerbates group tensions, playing negatively upon the heterogeneous character of 
American society. The stirring up of racial or ethnic "fears, bate, guilt and greed" is fundamentally 
opposed to the Framer's intent to ensure cooperative social pluralism. BELL, supra note 145, at 59. The 
goal of casting contempt on an ethnic group is not to participate in debate founded on the principle of 
pluralism, but to destroy it In this sense, racial defamation is subversive speech. Unlike political 
extremism, in which, (however distorted its form) the Framers' principle of self-government is evident, 
the principle underlying racial defamation is pure discrimination. Invidious racial and ethnic discrimina-
tion has been rejected as antithetical to American national policy. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 
574. The positive intent of the Framers to found a nation based on pluralism should not, therefore, be 
distorted to tolerate the free rein of vindictive attack which is unrelated, except in appearance, to any 
constitutional or national purpose. See, e.g., EPsTEiN & FORSTER, supra note 146, at 40; Brown, supra 
note 146, at 13. 
'51 The free speech guarantee is thus a means to the end, not the end in itself. See FREDERICK F. 
SOIAUER, THE LAw OF OBSCENITY 920 (1976) (claiming that "free speech is seen as an instrument of 
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Thus the narrowest historical interpretation of the free speech clause 
would limit its protection to the expression of purely political ideas. l59 The 
broadest interpretation would allow for an absolutist intent on the part of 
the Framers. The Supreme Court, however, has adopted neither extreme. 
Instead, it has identified political speech as merely the central value to be 
protected. Such an evaluation logically requires a consideration of content 
that is, what the speaker wants to say. 160 
The Founding Fathers' debate on the First Amendment was brief, for 
they recognized that the rights of free expression were inherent and be-
longed to the people.161 ''There are rights," wrote Thomas Jefferson in 
March of 1789, "which it is useless to surrender to the government, and 
which yet, governments have always been fond to invade. These are the 
rights of thinking and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing; the 
right of free commerce; the right of personal freedom."162 
Nevertheless, Jefferson's conception of the inalienable rights of speech 
and press was not absolute. In his draft constitution for Virginia, he had 
proposed freedom of the press "except so far as by commission of private 
injury cause may be given of private action."163 And in a letter to James 
Madison in August of 1789, Jefferson proposed to qualify what would 
become the First Amendment as follows: ''The people shall not be deprived 
or abridged of their right to speak or to write or otherwise to publish any 
thing but false facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, property, or 
reputation of others .... ,,164 
In short, interpreting the First Amendment to mean that suppression of 
good, not as a good in itself'); see also BURNS, supra note 147, at 62: 
Both sides [federalists and anti-federalists] invoked the Declaration of Independence and its 
call for the supreme values of liberty and equality. But what kind of liberty and equality? •.. 
rnhe issue that would become the grandest question of them all-the extent to which 
government should interfere with some persons' liberties in order to grant them and other 
persons more liberty and equality-thls issue lay beyond the intellectual horizons. 
159 For example, the Supreme Court's willingness to protect the wearing of a jacket with offensive 
words lettered on it or black armbands in school can be explained by the political nature of resistance 
to the unpopular war in Vietnam. See SCHAUR, supra note 158, at 13-14. 
"" The motivation behind particular protected speech as a basis for regulation cannot be 
questioned. Cf, Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961) 
(holding that protected speech aimed at elimination of competition did not violate antitrust laws); 
Henrico Prof. Firefighters Assoc. v. Board of Supervisors, 649 F.2d 237, 245 n.12 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that a speaker's motivation is irrelevant to First Amendment analysis). Any analysis of a 
speaker's motivation would necessarily scrutinize both the sincerity of his belief in certain ideas and 
his reasons for expressing them. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50,64-66 (1975); 
Finnis, supra note 144, at 222-23. 
161 See 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 731-32 (J. Gales ed. 1789), reprinted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE 
BIU.. OF RIGHI'S: A I>ocuMEm"ARY HIsToRY 1029 (1971). 
162 Jefferson, supra note 142, at 428, 429 (quoting from a letter to Col. David Humphreys, Mar. 
18, 1789). 
163 MAYER, supra note 141, at 169. 
164 [d. at 171 (quoting from a letter to James Madison, Aug. 28, 1789). 
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ideas is not a legitimate governmental purpose is but one of several read-
ings equally well-rooted in language and history.l6S 
2. The Right of Access 
Regardless (or because) of interpretations of the Framers' intent, clear 
law has evolved around the right of access to newspapers, limitations on 
government interference with them, and the characterization of public 
forums. 
While for the most part individuals may be guaranteed freedom from 
government regulation of their privately-owned presses, citizens have never 
had the right of access to someone else's printed pages:66 The Constitu-
tion does not grant a print forum to those without the wherewithal to start 
up their own newsapers, nor has Congress.167 
Is there any difference between the First Amendment rights afforded a 
privately-owned commercial newspaper and one sponsored by a private 
college or university? Is a public college or university newspaper any less 
protected by the Constitution? 
Since newspapers have limited publishing space (and funds), editors 
must use their subjective judgment on a regular basis to determine exactly 
what will be published and what will not. A paper may refuse to print 
certain editorial material because of its content or due to lack of space or, 
in the case of advertising, out of fmancial considerations. While rejection 
based on space or fmancial considerations does not constitute an infringe-
ment on free speech, a content-based rejection may:68 The constitutional-
ity of editorial discretion depends on the status of the publication-that is, 
whether it is an instrumentality of the state (in the language of the law, a 
"state actor"), or is privately owned, funded, and operated. l69 
Editors always make choices about what to publish, nurturing a bond 
of trust between them and their readers. That trust is violated if they 
knowingly disseminate historical lies like Holocaust-denial advertisements. 
With the power to publish comes the responsibility to seek truth, as well as 
to avoid defamatory propaganda.170 
'65 See David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REv. 429 
(1983). 
'66 See infra notes 171-75,205-20,222-25 and accompanying text 
'67 Congress has recognized the unfairness of broadcast monopolies, which are regulated by the 
Federal Communications Commission and subjected to various egalitarian measures such as equal-time 
requirements in political campaigns. 
'68 See Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1996); Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662, 
664 (8th Cir. 1987). 
169 See, e.g., Leeds, 85 F.3d at 54-55; Sinn, 829 F.ld at 665. 
170 Rosen, supra note 113, at 19. 
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Over two decades ago the Supreme Court held that a private newspa-
per had a constitutional right to determine whether or not to publish a 
specific article, editorial, or advertisement. In Miami Herald Publ' g Co. v. 
Tornillo,171 the Court rejected a Florida statute requiring newspapers to 
publish replies to political editorials. Its decision was based upon the First 
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press and freedom of speech. As 
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court, "the clear implication [of prece-
dent] has been that any ... compulsion to publish that which 'reason' tells 
[editors] should not be published is unconstitutional."172 
In essence, the Court held that editorial discretion under the First 
Amendment is almost absolute.173 Newspapers have a right to publish or 
refuse to publish whatever they choose-articles, editorials, or advertise-
ments. Even if the newspaper is the only one in town, or the biggest, or the 
most widely read, it can still print or reject practically anything. That an 
individual or group has the wherewithal to pay for an advertisement does 
not guarantee access to a newspaper owned or operated by others. It can 
even discriminate against a particular advertiser if it so desires. In the 
absence of fraud or monopoly,174 "it is immaterial whether such [dis-
crimination] is based upon reason or is the result of mere caprice, prejudice 
or malice. It is a part of the liberty of action which the Constitutions, State 
and Federal, guarantee to the citizen."17s 
Although privately owned and operated newspapers are by no means 
state actors, their First Amendment freedoms are not absolute. True, prior 
restraints are seldom countenanced under the Constitutionl76-the rare 
exceptions relate to the publication of editorial matter advocating acts likely 
to incite imminent lawless action177 or disclosing state secretsl78-but 
171 418 u.s. 241 (1974). 
172 Id. at 256 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 n.18 (1945». 
IT.l See id. 
174 See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (holding that publisher's policy 
of refusing to accept advertising from companies which also placed ads with publisher's competitors 
constituted a Sherman Act violation); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 
1957). 
'" Poughkeepsie Buying Serv., Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d SIS, 517 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954). This position appears to be the uniform holding among the states, with one 
exception. In Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P.(n.s.) 225 (1919), the court reasoned that the newspaper 
business was clothed with public interest and that a newspaper was in the class of a quasi-public cor-
poration bound to treat all advertisers fairly and without discrimination. Courts in other states have 
expressly rejected Uhlman. See, e.g., In re Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254, 256 (E.D. Mich. 1931); 
Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 247 N.W. 813 (Iowa 1933); Friedenberg v. Times Publ'g Co., 127 So. 
345 (La. 1930); see also Zachary Berman, Say What You Will: Not in My Newspaper, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 
18, 1992, at A22. 
176 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
177 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
178 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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newspapers may be punished after the fact for publishing libelousl79 or 
obscenel80 material. Thus private commercial newspapers may be prohibit-
ed from publishing information deemed damaging to national security181 
and exhortations to violence or civil disobedience,182 and punished for 
publishing defamatory stories183 and material considered obscene. l84 
On balance, though, privately owned and operated newspapers have 
virtually unfettered discretion about what to publish, and what not to 
publish. Just as editors are free to print almost anything, so can they decide 
what to reject. While the public might have a moral claim to have opinions 
expressed on editorial pages, it has no constitutional right of access to them. 
3. State Actors and Public Forums 
A private college or university newspaper is not a state actor (and 
therefore not protected by First Amendment guarantees), but is subject to 
the scrutiny of school administrators and bound by school policies. Al-
though most colleges and universities adopt policies that are compatible 
with expressing and testing new ideas, they retain the power to impose prior 
restraints which could prohibit publication of certain material based on its 
content. 
A common method by which censorship is imposed at private schools 
is by way of faculty review: a member of the journalism department 
typically reads and approves each issue before publication. ISS If this were 
done at a state college or university newspaper, it would amount to an 
unconstitutional prior restraint. 186 
Private schools are free, of course, to grant their students rights similar 
to those conferred by the First Amendment. l87 In a recent survey, nearly 
130 private colleges and universities were found to guarantee both students 
and faculty full freedom of the press, with the concomitant power subjec-
'79 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
'80 That is, which offends contemporary community standards. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
IS (1973). 
'8' See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 713. 
'82 See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 31S (1951). 
'83 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254. 
'84 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,23 (1973) (defining obscenity as sexually explicit 
matter offensive to "contemporary community standards"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 
(1957). 
'85 See Tony Lang, Latest Word on College Newspapers, ON. ENQUIRER, Jan. 9, 1994, at 01. 
,.. See Papisb v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, 
Comment, End 0/ an Era? The Decline 0/ Student Press Rights in the Wake o/Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 
v. Kublmeier, 1988 DUKE LJ. 706. 
'87 See Lang, supra note 185, at 01. Xavier University and the University of Miami are two 
examples of private universities which guarantee their students full First Amendment rights without any 
prior restraint See id. 
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tively to decide whether to publish a specific article, editorial or advertise-
ment. l88 
When students enter the schoolhouse gate of a state institution, even at 
the high-school level, they retain the same constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech as the general public.189 In Widmar v. Vincent,l90 the Supreme 
Court held that such First Amendment rights extend to campuses of state 
colleges and universities.191 Various lower courts have likewise effectively 
found that "state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the 
sweep of the First Amendment."I92 
Such rights, of course, are not absolute. Like all citizens, students are 
forbidden from inciting imminent lawless action.l93 Unlike the general 
public, however, they can be further restricted from doing (or saying, or 
writing) anything that school authorities deem a substantial interference with 
schoolwork or discipline.l94 The school's primary obligation is to maintain 
the order and discipline necessary for a successful educational process.l9S 
In 1988 the Supreme Court held that high school administrators "were 
entitled to prevent students from writing about specific cases of pregnancy 
and divorce."I96 Justice White (writing for the majority) in Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeierl97 found that "a school need not tolerate student 
speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic education mission' even though 
government could not censor similar speech outside the school."l98 How-
ever, the Court specifically limited its decision to high-school pUblications, 
saying, "[W]e need not now decide whether the same degree of deference 
is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the 
college and university level."l99 
A federal district court had already held that a college infringes on a 
school-sponsored paper's right to free speech when it requires that all 
material intended for publication be submitted to an advisory board-unless 
the institution can demonstrate that its infringement was necessary in order 
to achieve the needs of a scholastic environment. 200 
'88 See id. 
'89 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
'90 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
'9' See id. at 268-69; see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tin1cer, 393 U.S. at 503; 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
192 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180. 
'93 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
I!" See Tin1cer, 393 U.S. at 511; Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Colo. 1971). 
'95 See Tin1cer, 393 U.S. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
'96 Dirk Johnson, Censoring Campus News, N.Y. 'fiMEs, Nov. 6,1988, at 4A; see also Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlrneier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
'97 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
'98 Id. at 266 (citations omitted). 
199 Id. at 273 n.7. 
"'" See Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970). The school was 
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Nevertheless, while a state college or university may restrict a student's 
freedom of speech when such an imposition is necessary to maintain an 
environment conducive to learning, such a restriction may not always apply 
to the school's newspaper. The public college or university may be an arm 
of the state and its newspaper a state instrumentality, but whether a decision 
about what its student newspaper publishes constitutes state action is not 
clear. In some cases the campus paper expressly functions as a private 
entity, independent from the control of school officials, even though in all 
other aspects it appears to be an instrumentality of the state.201 
When a public institution's student newspaper is understood by both 
administration and editors to be a private entity, two factors are taken into 
account to determine whether the state is responsible for its decisions: the 
extent of the regulation and the receipt of public funds.202 
a. State Action 
In Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, a federal district court held that where a 
state university newspaper makes decisions independent from the control of 
university officials, even though it may be funded by the school and 
operates out of a campus building, its activities cannot be considered state 
action.203 The mere subsidization of a student newspaper without the 
exercise of coercive power, said the court, is not sufficient to "convert its 
actions into that of the state."204 
Thus the primary issue to be determined in cases involving a state-
supported college or university newspaper is whether school administrators 
are involved in the editorial decisions of the student newspaper. Where the 
newspaper is free from the control of the administration, its actions are 
viewed as being independent of the state and not subject to constitutional 
scrutiny. It follows in such cases that there has been no state action where 
an author of proffered material is denied access to the paper based on the 
material's content. 
In short, the campus newspaper of a state-supported university is 
entitled to the First Amendment's freedom of the press protec-
tion-including the freedom to exercise subjective editorial discretion by 
rejecting a proffered article, editorial, or advertisement.lOS 
Fitchburg State College. 
201 See Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 638 F. Supp 143, 148 (D. Neb. 1986), affd, 829 F.2d 662 (8th 
Cir. 1987). 
:zo:z See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982). 
2m See Sinn, 638 F. Supp. at 149. 
204 [d. 
"" See Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Time Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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In Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock,1J)6 the editor of the Missis-
sippi State University student newspaper denied access to an off-campus 
homosexual group which wanted to pay for an advertisement. The district 
court concluded that the decision of the editor cannot be subject to govern-
ment regulation or judicial interference and still be consistent with the 
newspaper's First Amendment rights.207 In so holding, the court empha-
sized that students elected the editor, and that university administrators did 
not supervise the newspaper staff nor exercise control over the material it 
published.208 
Even if state action can be demonstrated in other regards, the general 
public could not claim a constitutional right of access to a public 
university's pages.209 In Sinn, the editor of the Daily Nebraskan refused to 
print students' paid advertisements declaring their gay or lesbian orienta-
tion.2lD The district court concluded that the University of Nebraska's 
newspaper was not a state actor with respect to editorial decisions because 
it functioned as a private newspaper in that regard.211 The court dismissed 
arguments that the student newspaper was funded by the school and 
operated out of a university building-focusing instead on how much 
control or supervision the school administrators had over the paper and 
what was published.212 
Lastly, courts have held that while a state college or university is not 
compelled to create a student newspaper, once it has done so, administrators 
may not dictate what the publication will or will not print.213 
Thus editors of a state college or university newspaper have a right to 
editorial discretion-and school administrators do not. 
b. Public Forums 
For the general public to have unfettered access to a state college or 
university newspaper--one that is considered a state actor-it must also be 
demonstrated that the newspaper is a "public forum.,,214 
The Supreme Court has identified three kinds of public forums: (1) 
sidewalks, streets, and public parks; (2) spaces specifically set aside for 
,.,. 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976). 
>111 See ide at 1074-75. 
2Il8 See ide 
209 See Sinn, 638 F. Supp. at 150-51. 
110 See ide at 145. 
111 See ide at 149. 
111 See ide 
113 See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973); Antonelli, 308 F. Supp. at 
1337. 
114 Sinn, 638 F. Supp. at 151. 
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public discourse; and (3) other public property.215 The ftrst have always 
been considered places which "from time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens and 
discussing public questions," and are thus open to all on a frrst-come, frrst-
served basis without regard to the content of the messages being communi-
cated.216 So have the second, areas the government designates as places 
for public discourse and a free exchange of ideas.217 As for the third, the 
Court has found no constitutional right to access.218 
A student newspaper would not appear to ftt any of the categories 
where access is guaranteed. ''The mere fact that [it] is used for the commu-
nication of ideas does not make it a public forum."219 To the contrary, the 
very presence of editorial discretion precludes a constitutional right to 
access.22O Indeed it would be difficult to argue that a state college or 
university newspaper, with limited funds and publishing power, must as a 
matter of course publish every article, editorial, and advertisement it 
receives. 
But that very reasoning has occassionally held sway. In Lee v. Board 
of Regents, a federal district court held that a campus newspaper is "an 
important forum for the decimation of news and expression of opinion," and 
as such "it should be open to anyone who is willing to pay to have his 
views published."221 In light of Lee, it appears that courts could fmd a 
student newspaper to be a public forum, and require the newspaper to 
publish all proffered material on constitutional grounds. 
The holding in Lee, however, is decidedly a minority view. Most of 
the case law supports the proposition that a state college or university 
newspaper, as a nonpublic forum, may exercise its right to editorial discre-
tion and constitutionally deny access.222 "Implicit in the concept of the 
nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of 
subject matter and speaker identity. ,,223 Some of these distinctions may be 
impermissible in a public forum, but in a nonpublic forum (such as a 
newspaper) they are necessary in order for a newspaper to operate.224 
m See Perry Educ. Assoc. v. Peny Local Educator's Assoc., 460 u.s. 37, 45 (1983); see also 
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
216 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
217 See id. 
218 See id. at 46. 
21' SiM, 638 F. Supp. at 149. In SiM, the district court held that the Daily Nebraskan was not a 
public forum because it did not consent to unrestricted access by the general public, and did not 
relinquish editorial control over proffered material. See id. at 150-51. 
220 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 252-56 (1974). 
221 Lee v. Board of Regents, 306 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-01 (WD. Wis. 1969), affd. 441 F.2d 1257 
(7th Cir. 1971). 
222 See Joyner v. Whiting, 4n F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 1973). 
223 Perry, 460 U.S. at 49. 
22< Seeid. 
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Undoubtedly the weight of authority will eventually be amassed to 
support the conclusion that Holocaust-denial ads are afforded no protection 
by the First Amendment. No college paper need take any advertisement that 
is false and deceptive.22S 
B. Arguments in Deference to Freedom of Expression 
The traditional justification for viewing the First Amendment's 
guarantee of free expression as virtually absolute-the exceptions are few 
and narrow in scope-is to encourage an open and unfettered exchange of 
ideas.226 Thoughts that are abhorrent to a free society, the argument goes, 
will wither when aired but fester if suppressed.227 Moreover, who is to 
decide which ideas are abhorrent? Certainly not the government, reasoned 
the Constitution's Framers. Free speech is so precious and delicate a liberty 
it must be preserved at great cost. 228 Thus the depth of conviction in 
Voltaire's oft-quoted declaration: "I disapprove of what you say but 1 will 
defend to the death your right to say it. ,,229 
The interest which the First Amendment guards and which gives it its 
importance, said Learned Hand, presupposes that there are no orthodox-
ies-religious, political, economic, or scientific-which are immune from 
debate.no 
Others have pointed to the First Amendment's goal of ascertaining the 
truth: "Through the acquisition of new knowledge, the toleration of new 
ideas, the testing of opinion in open competition, the discipline of rethink-
ing its assumptions, a society will be better able to reach common decisions 
that will meet the needs and aspirations of its members.,,231 
A more current statement of jurisprudential philosophy justifying 
traditional First-Amendment principle-particularly the notion that Ameri-
22S See Ristiner, supra note 82, at AI. 
Z2II See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
m See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76. 
Z2II See Lasson, supra note 140, at 78. 
22'1 There is some doubt that Voltaire actually made this statement, although it is indicative of an 
attitude attributed to him. See BURT STEVENSON, THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 726, 2776 (lOth 
ed. 1967); S.G. TAUENTYRE, THE FRIENDs OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907); see also statement by Alan 
Dershowitz, infra note 330 and accompanying text 
2JO See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950), 
affd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951). 
231 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 854, 882 
(1963). Professor Emerson's seminal article suggested three other First-Amendment values besides 
truth-seeking: individual self-fulfillment; securing participation by members of society in social and 
political decision-making; and maintaining a balance between stability and change. See iII. at 879-86; 
see also infra Part D.C.1. 
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can concepts of tolerance are noble and defensible-was voiced by Lee 
Bollinger in his oft-cited 1986 book entitled The Tolerant Society.232 
Extolling the virtue of magnanimity and the First Amendment's function in 
developing a capacity for tolerance, Dean Bollinger claims that the tolera-
tion of verbal acts inculcates a "tolerance ethic," which he describes as "a 
general disposition of being able to put aside our beliefs, of overcoming the 
instinct to have things our own way, to control, to dominate. It is to live in 
a world of difference, and to do so comfortably.,,233 In essence, he says, 
"tolerance is to democracy what courage is to war.,,2J4 
Among the most frequently cited arguments in favor of protecting 
offensive expression are: to preserve legitimate scientific and scholarly 
inquiry,235 to document bigotry in all its forms,236 and to avoid the dan-
gers of line-drawing that censorship and criminalization often encumber.237 
1. Inquiry and Debate 
Both legitimate scientific method and traditional scholarly inquiry 
demand that all evidence be recognized, investigated, and analyzed before 
conclusions can be drawn.238 This standard applies not only to orthodox 
views, but to unpopular (even offensive) ones as well. 
In a true democracy the government may not dictate what is right or 
wrong, true or false. No matter how obvious the distinctions may appear to 
be between historical fact and racist theory-a differentiation perhaps best 
illustrated by Holocaust denial-only the People can reject the expression 
of any thought, whether spoken or written, and even then only as a matter 
of individual choice.239 
. It follows that we should educate our children to tolerate the diverse 
views of a pluralistic society. Just as we countenance others who advocate 
different ways of looking at the world-even as we may disagree with 
them-our textbooks should reflect the existence (if not the soundness) of 
denial theories. Thus, if public schools teach the Holocaust as a historical 
event, they must also teach that it may not have happened; if parents object 
2J2 LEE c. BOll.lNGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDoM OF SPEECH AND ExTREMIST SPEECH 
IN AMERICA (1986). 
233 Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 979,986 
(1990). 
214 [d. at 988. 
m See infra Part n.B.1. 
216 See infra Part n.B.2. 
m See infra Part n.B.3. 
m See, e.g., ERNEsT NAGEL, THE STRUCfURE OF SCIENCE: PROBUlMS IN THE LoGIC OF SCIENTIF-
IC ExPLANATION 1-14 (1961). 
". See Debate, supra note 2, at 588 (statement by Alan Dershowitz). 
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to what they consider a historical fabrication, their children should be 
excused from class; if a state university funds speakers, it must tolerate 
deniers. Just as Holocaust denial may be seen as a threat to the ultimate 
power of reason, belief in the ultimate power of reason requires recognition 
of denial theories.240 
2. The Need to Document Racism 
If reason is to prevail, the existence of racism in all forms must be 
documented. This is true of both fact and fiction. If we are to learn from 
history, what is the difference between the Nazis' foul deeds and their 
descendants' denial of them? It is as important for later generations to 
witness the propaganda of genocide as to see its effects, to hear the exhorta-
tions of racism as well as its results. Why should we suppress Holocaust de-
nial when we have the benefit of the Nazis' own diabolically meticulous 
record keeping-tbe millions of personal effects they confiscated and 
itemized, the identification numbers burned into the flesh of their victims' 
arms, the logs of scientific experiments in torture, and ultimately the precise 
tallies of lives snuffed out? Both the propaganda and the facts depict the 
personification of evil. To expurgate either would blur the facts of history 
and blot out the memory of all those martyred because of their ethnicity, 
murdered because of their race. 
3. The Dangers of Censorship 
Few Americans want the government to decide for them what they can 
hear on the street comer, read in the library, or see in the cinema. It is not 
difficult to fmd abuses in the name of fair play, especially in countries 
which (unlike the United States) permit censorship and criminalization of 
that which the government fmds to be hate speech.241 
Criminalization illustrates the difficulties of line-drawing. For example, 
the distinguished historian Bernard Lewis was recently found guilty, in 
Paris, France, of expressing doubts that the massacre of 1.5 million Arme-
nians early in this century by the Ottoman Empire could be correctly termed 
a "genocide.,,242 
2C) See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. LJ. 453, 483-84 (1996). But see infra notes 
333-34 and accompanying text (suggesting the Holocaust is a crime that lies outside both speech and 
reason). 
24' For a list of those countries, see infra note 286. 
241 At first several Armenian groups sought to have Prof. Lewis prosecuted under France's 
criminal Holocaust denial law, but a court ruled that the statute applied only to the Nazi regime of 
terror. The groups were more successful before a subsequent civil tribunal, which found Lewis guilty 
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In Gennany, a relatively recent law makes it a crime to deny the 
Holocaust "or another violent and arbitrary dominance."243 This clause 
became quite contentious, the resulting controversy centering around the 
issues of restricting historical facts, promoting national consciousness, 
attributing collective guilt, and identifying the role of courts in punishing 
lies.244 Should denial of the violent expulsion of Gennans from Soviet-
occupied East Germany be punishable? In other words, was the Holocaust 
a unique phenomenon?24S 
If Auschwitz is unique, the argument goes, then the clause "or another 
violent and arbitrary dominance" should have been eliminated; this addition 
renders the Holocaust unjustifiably relative, and offends both the memory 
of those murdered and the sensibilities of survivors.246 
In addition, the experience with earlier legislation shows that hate-
speech defendants, almost without exception, remain convinced if not 
strengthened in the truth of their contentions. Not only is deterrence 
unlikely, there is a real danger of backlash. The lie is forbidden but liars 
remain. The judicial process cannot carry the burden of education that 
should fall to family, school, and political discourse. To the contrary, the 
Gennan courts have become forums for neo-Nazi propaganda.247 
Moreover, the task of drawing a line between "good" and "bad" is 
exceedingly difficult. Every year in the United States, various books are 
banned by public libraries. They have included everything from Thomas 
Paine's The Age of Reason and John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath to 
Charles Darwin's On the Origin of the Species and the King James version 
of the Holy Bible.241l In recent years the growing influence of the religious 
right has been reflected in challenges to books about the occult, homosexu-
als, and racial minorities.249 
In Canada, customs officials issue a list of imported materials that are 
reviewed for their potential to stir up racial hatred. Of the ninety titles on 
a recent list, only four were banned, including: the standard anti-Semitic 
text, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion; Henry Ford's The International 
and fined him $2000 (while declining to rule on whether his opinion as expressed was right or wrong). 
See 'Hate Speech' Again. Abroad, WASH. PosT, SepL 9, 1995, at A16. "[W]hen a court is willing to 
punish a scholar-or anyone, for that matter," editorialized the Washington Post, "for expressing an 
'insulting' opinion on a historical matter, even when debate on the point in question has been raging 
worldwide for years, the absurdity and perniciousness of such laws is on full display." [d. 
W Stein, supra note 58, at 323-24 (translating ArL 194 StGB); see infra note 316 and accompany-
ing texL 
,.. See Correspondence, On the 'Auschwitz Lie,' 87 MICH. L. REv. 1026, 1031 (1989). 
24S See id. at 1026. 
... [d. at 1030. 
U/ See Stein, supra note 58, at 315. 
248 See Rekha Basu, Banned Books Given Spotlight, DES MoINES REG., SepL 29, 1995, at 1. 
249 For example, in Queens, N.Y., a book about Martin Luther King was opposed by a school-
board member who viewed him as a "leftist hoodlum with significant Communist ties." [d. an. 
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Jew: The World's Foremost Problem; and Arthur Butz's The Hoax of the 
Twentieth Century.2S0 Those that were not banned included An Empire of 
Their Own: How Jews Invented Hollywood and Aryan Outlaws in a Zionist 
Police State.251 
There is little evidence that banning hate speech and literature serves 
to inhibit it. On the other hand, line-drawing has proven all but impossible. 
C. Arguments for Regulating Hate Speech 
A persistent American shibboleth is that the First Amendment is 
virtually absolute-that the Constitution guarantees everyone the freedom 
of self-expression, and anything which restricts this right is a step on the 
road toward tyranny. In the vernacular, "It's a free country and I can say 
whatever I want. .. 252 
That it is difficult to draw a line between acceptable and nonacceptable 
expression, however, and hard to allocate responsibility for deciding what 
speech should be restricted, is too facile a rationale to justify a rule of 
absolute construction. The carefully drawn exceptions to the rule of free 
speech are based on logical demonstrations that there are certain utterances 
which must be limited even (if not especially) in a democratic society.253 
The very existence of the doctrines in exception-"fighting words, .. 254 
"clear and present danger,"25S "captive audience,"256 "legitimate time, 
place, and manner restrictions .. 257 -belies the simplistic popular under-
standing of free speech.258 Such contextual limitations are joined by those 
which regulate content like obscenity and pornography,259 matters of na-
tional security,260 and threats against the President.261 It is unarguable 
2SO See Carol Berger. Hale Book Sparlcs Debate of Freedom. EDMONTON J .• Jan. 24. 1995. at A7. 
2>. See id. 
2>2 Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas generally took the First Amendment literally to 
mean that Congress could make no law abridging free speecb "without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 
·wbereases ... • Beaubamais v. Dlinois. 343 U.S. 250. 275 (1952) (Black. J .• dissenting); see also 
Columbia Broadcasting Sys .• Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm .• 412 U.S. 94. 156 (1973) (Douglas. J .• 
concurring) ("The First Amendment is written in tenns that are absolute .... The ban of 'no' law that 
abridges freedom of the press is in my view total and absolute."). 
2>l Lasson. supra note 140. at 79. 
2>4 For a comprebensive discussion. see RODNEY A. SMOLLA. 1 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDoM 
OF SPEECH § 10.32-34 (3d ed. 1996). 
255 See iII. § 10, 2-50. 
". See id. § 5. 1-16. 
m See id. § 8. 45-71. 
258 See generally Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First 
Amendment. 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 11. 20-30 (1985). 
2S9 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Young v. American Mini Theaters. 427 
U.S. 50 (1976); Roth v. United States. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
200 See, e.g .• Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Debs v. United States. 249 U.S. 211 
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that there should be absolute freedom to think what one wants; it does not 
follow, however-either legally, logically, or philosophically-that one may 
openly express whatever one thinks, whenever and wherever one de-
sires.262 
1. Fallacies in First Amendment Ideology 
A majority of civil libertarians continue to advocate the First Amend-
ment ideology that no orthodoxies should be immune from debate and 
dispute, but a growing number of constitutional scholars have begun to 
argue that that view should be "bemoaned and resisted rather than accepted 
or celebrated."263 
Those in favor of regulating hate speech are often held to a higher 
standard (if not regarded in lower esteem) by First Amendment purists. For 
example, historian Leonard Levy's sponsors refused to publish his conclu-
sion that (contrary to his earlier beliefs) the Framers of the Constitution had 
a far narrower conception of free speech and press.2M Other arguments in 
support of regulating hate speech are often stigmatized by the widely 
accepted ideology that urges courts to offer even greater protections of free 
speech.2M 
Even Dean Bollinger concedes that "tolerance has its limits" and that 
different societies must of necessity treat hate speech differently. 266 The 
slippery slope theory so often invoked by civillibertarians-dubbed by one 
doubter as "trickle-down chilling,,267-bas not materialized in any other 
Western democracy. Yet all Western democracies but the United States 
have laws prohibiting the dissemination of hate speech. 
Traditional libertarians also argue that if one government can officially 
stipulate that the Holocaust occurred, then another government somewhere, 
sometime, can declare that it did not occur. Others say, "the grander the 
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
261 See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
262 See MAYER, supra note 141, at 171-72 (discussing Jefferson's views on the liability of 
publishers for false facts printed, despite freedom of the press, and criminal acts dictated by religious 
error as punishable despite guarantee of free exercise of religion); see generally Lasson, supra note 
140, at 97. 
263 Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment as Ideology, 33 WM. & MARy L. REv. 853, 854 
(1992). 
,.. See generally LEoNARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: fREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PREss IN 
EARLy AMERICAN HISTORY (1960). 
26S See generally Schauer, supra note 263. 
266 Bollinger, supra note 233, at 995. In Germany, for example, as long as the Holocaust remains 
part of recent memory, it will be difficult not to punish the expression of Nazi ideology. See id. at 990. 
267 Schauer, supra note 263, at 867. 
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truth, the bigger the lie.,,268 But such arguments are rendered speculative 
and facile, and ultimately meritless, when placed in the real life context of 
what happens elsewhere. 
2. The Costs of Bigotry 
A number of legal scholars have asserted that the harm of hate speech 
matters. Whatever form such speech takes, its purpose and effect is to deny 
the humanity of a group of people, making them objects of ridicule and 
humiliation so that acts of aggression against them, no matter how violent, 
are taken less seriously.269 Meanwhile, the targets of such behavior often 
respond to it with fear and withdrawal; the more they are silenced, the 
deeper their inequality becomes; many suffer post-traumatic stress disorders 
of varying degrees.270 
Hate speech may be analyzed as the fIrSt stage in a continuum of 
increasing violence and intimidation, followed by avoidance, discrimination, 
attack, and extermination. As illustrated by the history of the Third Reich, 
each stage is dependent upon the preceding one: it was Hitler's vocal anti-
semitism that led Germans to avoid their Jewish neighbors and friends, 
which in turn enabled easier enactment of the blatantly discriminatory 
Nuremberg laws, which in turn made synagogue desecration and street 
mugging more acceptable, which in turn allowed for creation of the killing 
fields in the death camps.271 
The capacity of speech to cause injury in diverse ways is often viewed 
as a price that must be paid to ensure a truly free and democratic society. 
But even free societies must allocate the cost of injuries. If we permit 
individuals to recover damages for defamation, why not permit groups to 
prove that they (i.e., their members) have suffered injury from hate 
speech?2n 
The argument that it is too difficult to draw the line between what is 
acceptable speech and what is not often fails to countenance the idea that 
the entire history of law could be described in terms of reasonable line-
drawing. This has been true even in First Amendment cases, such as those 
involving false advertising,273 offensive pornography,274 state secrets,275 
268 Debate, supra note 2, at 571 (statement by Alan Dershowitz); see also id. at 582-83. 
,.. See Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction 0/ Freedom 0/ Ex-
pression, 96 U. Iu... L. REv. 789, 792 (1996). 
210 See generally Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action/or Raciallnsulls, Epithets, 
and Name-Calling, 17 MARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Marl M. Matsuda, Public Response to 
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989). 
27. See GoRDON W. Ain'ORT, THE NATURE OF PREJuDICE 14-15 (1954). 
272 See Lasson, supra note 140, at 108-28. 
m See, e.g., Virginia State Rd. ofPhannacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
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and defamation.276 People who feel they have been greviously hurt by 
someone else's words--such as Holocaust survivors whose suffering has 
been denied2'n -ought to have a civil remedy. Free speech should not 
mean speech without cost.278 
A tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress would seem 
to be an appropriate remedy for racial insults, but courts have generally 
limited recovery to plaintiffs who suffered some physical injury caused by 
"extreme and outrageous conduct."m In many instances racial insults 
would fall short of that standard, particularly if they were simply statements 
of opinion. Calls to establish another tort, one specifically aimed at com-
batting racial insults, have thus far fallen on deaf ears.280 
The few plaintiffs who have been awarded damages for emotional 
distress caused by hate speech have not been challenged on First 
Amendment grounds.lBl If they had been, however,good counter-argu-
ments could be made that such speech does not fall within any of the 
classic categories of values said to be protected by the Constitution: 
individual self-fulfillment; truth-seeking; securing participation by members 
of society in social and political decision-making; and maintaining a balance 
between stability and change.282 Bigotry stifles, rather than enhances, 
moral and social growth. If truth-seeking is to achieve the best decisions on 
matters of interest to all, most racial insults can be distinguished: a call for 
genocide can hardly be characterized as the best decision for all. Rather 
than allow all members of society to voice their opinions, racial insults 
748 (1976). 
... See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
27> See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); New York Times Co. 
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
%76 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
m See Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (Dl. 1978) (allowing neo-Nazis 
to march through residential area largely inhabited by Holocaust survivors). 
m See Debate, supra note 2, at 576 (quoting Arthur Berney). 
279 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also Stephen Fleischer, Campus Speech 
Codes: The Threat to Liberal Education, 27 J. MARsHAlL L. REv. 709, 724-25 (1994). But see Geri 
J. Yanover, Anti·Semitism and Holocaust Denial in the Academy: A Tort Remedy, 101 DICK. L. REv. 
71 (1996) (arguing strongly for the viability of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a remedy 
for Holocaust denial). 
280 See Delgado, supra note 270, at 252. Prof. Delgado notes, however, that although his call for 
establishment of a tort for racial insults has not been heeded, over the years since his article first 
appeared, a number of courts have recognized various causes of action to redress racist slurs. 
Telephone Coversation with Richard Delgado, Professor of Law, UCLA Law School (Sept. II, 1996). 
28' See Delgado, supra note 270, at 172; see also Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. Fla. 
1973); Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1979); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 
1970); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach, Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977). 
212 See Emerson, supra note 231, at 879-86. This function of the First Amendment has been 
viewed by some as limited to political ideas. See Delgado, supra note 270, at 175-79; see generally 
ALExANDER MEIKLEJOHN, PounCAL FREEDoM (1960). 
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contribute to a stratified society. Finally, rather than contribute to a balance 
between stability and change, racial insults foment discord and violence.283 
3. The Experience Elsewhere 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion requires the condemnation and criminalization of "all propaganda ... 
based on ideas or theories of superiority ... or which attempt to justify or 
promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form.,,284 The European 
Commission on Human Rights has found such laws to be justifiable limits 
on the freedom of expression.285 
In fact every Western democracy with the exception of the United 
States has laws which punish various forms of hate speech, and a number 
of them specifically prohibit Holocaust denial.286 The debate elsewhere is 
not whether to control hate speech, but how. Canada, England, France, 
Germany, and Sweden are most notable among the countries whose values 
of social liberty are similar to those in the United States. 
Even though Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms287 provides a 
comprehensive guarantee for free speech with language even broader than 
that of the First Amendment, the country also has a number of other laws 
that effectively seek to regulate hate speech. A criminal statute prohibits 
three types of hate propaganda: (a) advocacy of genocide; (b) commu-
nications inciting hatred against an identifiable group where a breach of the 
peace is likely to follow; and (c) public and willful expression of ideas 
intended to promote hatred against an identifiable groUp.288 
In addition, Canada's Human Rights Act prohibits use of the telephone 
to record hate messages.289 The Broadcasting Act authorizes standards for 
radio and television, and prohibits abusive comment likely to expose 
individuals or groups to contempt on the basis of their race, ethnicity, 
religion, sex, color, age, or mental or physical disability.290 The Customs 
Act prohibits importation of hate propaganda.291 
283 See Emerson, supra note 231, at 879-86. 
,... Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 194, 3 
I.L.M. 164, 166-67. 
283 See STEPHEN J. ROTH, THE LEGAL FlGID" AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM: SURVEY OF DEVELOP-
MENTS IN 1993 23-26 (1995). 
2116 Countries punishing hate speech generally include Belgium, Brazil, Cyprus, England, Italy, and 
the Netherlands. Those specifically prohibiting Holocaust denial include Austria. Belgium, France, 
Gennany, Israel, and Switzerland. See id. 
,.., CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGIITS AND fREEDoMS, 1 S.C. v (1982). 
288 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319 (1985) (Can.). 
289 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H-6 (1985) (Can.). 
290 Broadcasting Act, R.S.C., ch. B-9, § 3 (1985) (Can.). 
291 Customs Act, R.S.C., ch. I, § 181 (1985) (Can.). 
1997] HOLOCAUST DBNIAL AND THE FIRsT AMENoMENJ' 73 
Using these laws, Canadian courts have held that hate speech does not 
belong in any category of expression that deserves constitutional protection. 
Interestingly, one Canadian court expressly supported that principle by 
extensive references to American cases, especially Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois.292 
Perhaps the most famous test case in Canada was that of Ernst 
Zundel. 293 Zundel contributed to a book called The Hitler We Love and 
Why;294 he also arranged distribution of a tract entitled Did Six Million 
Really Die?,29S which claimed that the Holocaust was in fact a Zionist 
swindle. He was charged with violating the Canadian criminal code by pub-
lishing false statements "likely to cause injury or mischief to a public inter-
est.,,296 
The prosecution chose to prove the falsity of Zundel's claim solely by 
showing a documentary fllm first used at the Nuremberg Trials entitled Nazi 
Concentration Camps. Zundel was convicted and sentenced to two years in 
prison.297 On appeal, however, the conviction was overturned, on the 
grounds that-because the ftlm's nameless screenplay writer and narrator 
were unavailable for cross-examination-the documentary failed under the 
rules of hearsay. 298 
In another case under the Canadian statute, a Canadian high-school 
teacher was charged with violating the Criminal Code for teaching his 
students that the Holocaust was a hoax and that Jews were responsible for 
all the world's problems.299 If the students' exams reflected his view, they 
received good grades; if not, poor ones. He challenged the law on the basis 
that it infriitged upon his guaranteed right to free expression.300 
In upholding the legislation, the Supreme Court of Canada linked the 
psychological and emotional harm caused by hate propaganda to the target 
group's constitutional right of equality.lOt The court found that hate pro-
paganda against particular groups must be prevented if multiculturalism is 
to be preserved and enhanced; that its "truth value" is marginal; that it 
292 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (holding that defamation of groups may be treated the same way as libel 
of individuals); see R. v. Keegstra [1990] S.C.R. 697, 7m, 739-41 ("Credible arguments have been 
made that later Supreme Court cases do not necessarily erode [Beauhamais'J legitimacy (see, e.g., K. 
Lasson, Racial Defamation As Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REv. 11."(1985»). 
293 R. v. Zundel [1987J 7 W.C.B.2d 26, ajJ'd, [1990J 9 W.C.B.2d 238, rev'd, [1992J 17 W.C.B.2d 
106; see also supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra note 33. 
195 See supra note 34. 
296 R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 177 (1970) (Can.). 
297 Zundel, 7 W.C.B.2d at 26. 
M Zundel, 17 W.C.B.2d at 106. 
199 See R. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
JOO See ill. at 703. 
30. See ill. 
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denies citizens meaningful participation in the democratic process; and that 
its contribution to self-fulfillment and human flourishing is negligible.302 
England has sought by statute to restrict racist expression since 1936, 
when the Public Order Act was passed to combat anti-Semitic fascist 
demonstrations.303 The act banned the wearing of uniforms during public 
demonstrations and broadened the state's power to prohibit a march or 
demonstration deemed likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The law was 
periodically strengthened, so that by 1963 the burden was placed on the 
speaker to prove that his words were not likely to provoke a breach of the 
peace.304 Subsequent acts prohibited the display of any threatening signs 
and racial incitement by spoken or written words. lOS 
In France, more than one famous figure has faced charges for negating 
crimes against humanity, a criminal offense. Most recently the French 
author Roger Garaudy was cited for denouncing what he called Jewish 
"Shoah business" and claiming that Israel has exploited the Holocaust to put 
itself "above all intemationallaw.,,306 
In 1990 Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of France's right-wing National 
Front party, referred to the Nazi gas chambers as "a detail of history.,,307 
Outraged survivors joined in a lawsuit against him, and a local court found 
Le Pen guilty of trivializing the Holocaust and fmed him a symbolic one 
franc.308 But Le Pen appealed the ruling, claiming his freedom of expres-
sion was being denied.309 A court of appeals not only upheld the decision, 
but increased the fme to 900,000 francs (about $180,000).310 
In Germany, free speech claims must be weighed against the values of 
human dignity and personal honor.311 A 1985 law-motivated primarily 
by the perceived need to facilitate prosecution of an increasing number of 
cases involving the "Auschwitz lie" (the claim that Germany's attempts to 
J02 See itl. at 744-68; see also Canadian Human Rights Comm'n v. Taylor [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 
(denying protection to a group prosecuted for operating a telephone service which played prerecorded 
messages denigrating the Jewish race and religion); R. v. Andrews [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870 (refusing to 
extend constitutional protection to leaders of a white supremacist group prosecuted for publishing a 
newspaper that expressed anti-Semitic beliefs, including the proposition that the Holocaust was a Zion-
ist hoax). 
303 Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6 (Eng.). 
"" See Public Order Act, 1963, ch. 52 (Eng.). 
!05 See Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73 (Eng.); see generally Kenneth Lasson, Racism in Great 
Britllin: Drawing the Line on Free Speech, 7 B.C. THIRD WORlD LJ. 161 (1987). 
306 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text 
307 See Comeuppance for a Bigot, TiME, Apr. I, 1991, at 50. 
lOS See itl. 
309 See itl. 
310 See itl. It was not until 1995 that France publicly admitted responsibility for deporting almost 
70,000 Jews to Nazi death camp8-(lnly 2,800 of whom returned. See Gail Russel Chaddock, Cleric's 
Comments Ignite the Fury of French Media, Cmus1lAN SO. MONITOR, July 25, 1996, at 5. 
311 See Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United Stiltes and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 693 (1980). 
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extenninate European Jews never took place)-made it a crime in Gennany 
to deny the Holocaust "or any other violent and arbitrary dorninance.,,3\2 
The law prohibits attacks on human dignity by incitement to hatred and 
dissemination of writings instigating hatred (both offenses against the public 
peace), and the less serious and less punishable offenses of insult, ridicule, 
and defamation.313 The new law in essence eliminated the old requirement 
that an insult be prosecuted by way of a private petition, and added a clause 
that the insulted party be a member of a group that was persecuted "under 
the National Socialist or another violent and arbitrary dominance.,,314 
As noted earlier, the law's inclusion of "another violent and arbitrary 
dominance" has become the source of some contention.3lS How much 
historical speech can be reasonably restricted? What role should the courts 
play in punishing lies? Should denial of the violent expulsion of Germans 
from Soviet-occupied East Gennany be punishable? In other words, was the 
Holocaust a unique phenomenon? If Auschwitz is unique, the law should 
single it out as well; punishing denial of "any other violent and arbitrary 
dominance" offends both the memory of those murdered and the sensibil-
ities of survivors. When the last victim of Nazi Gennany has passed on, 
will there be anyone to initiate prosecution?316 
Despite the law's somewhat vague language and its political implica-
tions, most German courts and prosecutors have tried seriously to apply 
them in specific cases. The Federal Supreme Court, the country's highest 
tribunal in civil and criminal matters, took judicial notice that the Holocaust 
occurred and summarily dismissed the constitutional free-speech question: 
No one who denies the historic fact of the murder of the Jews in the "Third 
Reich" can invoke the guarantee of freedom of opinion . . . . Even in a 
confrontation on a question that concerns substantially the public as is the case 
here, no one has a protected interest to publicize untrue allegations. The docu-
ments about the destruction of millions of Jews are overwhelming.317 
"2 Stein, supra note 58, at 322 (translating Art. 130 StGB) (punishing attack on human dignity by 
incitement to hate). The new law was prompted by a sharp increase in neo-Nazi activities in the 
1980's. See iII. at 305. 
m [d. at 322 (translating Art. 130 StGB). The law against insult (§ 185), which punishes offenses 
against personal honor, has been part of Germany's Criminal Code since its inception in 1871. From 
that year until the end of World War II, although the German Supreme Court regularly utilized this 
article to protect Germans living in Prussian provinces, large landowners, all Christian clerics, and 
German military officers, it consistently refused to apply the same law to insults against the Jewish 
people. See iII. at 286. That failure is in striking contrast to the current application of the law, which 
singles out Jews as a group for special protection. 
"4 [d. at 312. 
315 See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text. 
"6 See Stein, supra note 58, at 312-13. 
m BGH Gr. Sen. Z. 75, 160 (161). To the extent they have considered the constitutional question 
at all, the lower tribunals have taken essentially the same view. See Stein, supra note 58, at 288. 
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Although Genoan trial courts have been somewhat reluctant to convict 
those charged with attacks on human dignity, their decisions have frequent-
ly been overturned by the state courts of appeal and, even more consistent-
ly, by the Federal Supreme COurt.318 This phenomenon may be explained 
by the younger age of trial judges-that is, they are less likely to be 
burdened by oppressive memories and personal guilt about the Holocaust, 
and are perhaps less responsive to the national policy that has reflected both 
recent experience and a sensitivity to international opinion.319 
A broad range of activities has been prosecuted, including remarks by 
teachers and students that the death of Jews in concentration camp gas 
chambers was "an American invention.'t320 In one notable case, the pub-
lisher of a periodical was charged with inciting insults for printing a letter 
to the editor which branded the "destruction of six million Jews" a lie and 
declared: ''Thus, once more one who opposes Jewish propaganda is silenced 
while Jews(!) are trained as teachers for Genoan children.,,311 The trial 
court dismissed the charge on the ground that the editor could not be held 
criminally responsible for merely publishing a letter addressed to him, but 
the appeals court reversed, reasoning that publication of the letter was likely 
to "disturb public peace by potentially shaking the sense of security of the 
attacked group or by provoking the 'incited' group to insults."311 
In 1994, Gennany' s constitutional court ruled that groups propagating 
the so-called "Auschwitz lie" cannot invoke freedom of speech as a 
defense.313 In 1995, a state court in Berlin convicted a leader of 
Genoany's neo-Nazi movement for spreading racial hatred and denigrating 
the state when he confronted visitors at the Auschwitz concentration camp 
with his claim that the Holocaust never happened.324 
While Sweden specifically guarantees its citizens a number of liberties 
(including the freedoms of expression, press, and assembly), its Instrument 
of Government also sets explicit limits. For example, the Riksdag 
(Sweden's governing body) may restrict various freedoms of expression in 
318 See Stein, supra note 58, at 289-99. 
319 See id. 
3'" See id. at 294-96. 
321 [d. at 295 (citing MDR 32, 333 (333». 
322 See id. 
323 The decision banned a meeting at which British Holocaust-denier David Irving was to speak. 
The ruling also ordered regional courts in Germany to consider specifically whether defendants had 
insulted the dignity of Jews by propagating the Auschwitz lie. Holocaust Denial Not Covered by Free 
Speech, Reuters World Service, Apr. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File. 
324 The defendant, Bela Ewald Althans, has garnered considerable press attention as he seeks to 
build links between neo-fascist jp-oups across Germany and around the world. Today there are 
approximately 40,000 neo-Nazis among Germany's population of 80 million. See Rick Atkinson, 
Denial ofNQzj Holocaust Brings 3 liZ-Year Sentence, WASH. POsT, Aug. 30, 1995, at A18. 
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order to achieve "a purpose which is acceptable in a democratic soci-
ety."325 With the same purpose, the Swedish Penal Code prohibits racial 
defamation.326 
In the United States-by way of stark contrast-the only jurispruden-
tial remedy against Holocaust denial has been via contract law. In 1980, the 
aforementioned Institute for Historical Review offered a $50,000 reward for 
proof that Jews were gassed at Auschwitz.327 A Holocaust survivor named 
Mel Mermelstein claimed the reward, submitting as proof declarations by 
other survivors who witnessed friends and relatives being taken away to 
their deaths by the Nazis.328 His own testimony described how he watched 
his mother and sister led to gas chambers. When the Institute told him the 
offer had been withdrawn because there had been no takers, he sued. The 
court, fmding "the fact that Jews were gassed at Auschwitz is indisputable," 
ordered the reward paid.329 
m. THE QUEST FOR TRUTH IN A FREE SOCIETY 
[Cjourts and governments should never be allowed to be arbiters of 
truth; should never be allowed to be arbiters of whether a particular historical 
event occurred or didn't occur. / am categorically opposed to any court, any 
school board, any governmental agent taking judicial notice about any histori-
cal event, even one that / know to the absolute core of my being occurred, like 
the Holocaust./ don't want the government to tell me that it occurred because 
/ don't want any government ever to tell me that it didn't occur. 
- Alan Dershowitz330 
People in radio and newspapers get paid to stir things up. No one even 
searches for the truth. 
- Bobby Valentine331 
Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. 
- Felix Frankfurte~32 
32> IG 2:12-2:14. 
3'" Penal Code ch. 16, § 8 (1972); see generally Lasson, supra note 140, at 87-88. 
327 See Lawsuit Over Proof of Holocaust Ends with Payment to a Survivor, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 
1985, at A12 [hereinafter Lawsuit]. 
328 See id. 
329 Mennelstein v. Institute for Historical Review, No. C356 542 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 22, 1985). 
The case was settled when the Institute agreed to pay the $50,000, plus $100,000 for Mennelstein's 
pain and suffering caused by the revoked offer. See Lawsuit, supra note 327, at A12. 
3lO Debate, supra note 2, at 566. Dershowitz is a professor of law at Harvard University. 
33. Renee Graham, Getting Buzzed on the Circuit, B. GLOBE, Aug. 13, 1997, at D3. Bobby 
Valentine is the current manager of the New York Mets. 
332 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.). 
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A. Uniqueness and the "Auschwitz Lie" 
Proving a crime as monstrous as genocide threatens to expose the 
law's limits. The capacity of the Nuremberg Tribunal to comprehend the 
practice of genocide in conventional terms of criminality was an over-
whelming challenge, which may have contributed to a failure to grasp fully 
the nature and meaning of the Nazis' effort to exterminate the Jewish popu-
lation of Europe.333 
The argument that the Holocaust is a unique crime whose enonnity 
puts it beyond traditional norms of trial and punishment cannot be easily 
dismissed. The world of Auschwitz has often been said to lie outside both 
speech and reason.334 
B. Ignorance and Education 
Various polls have demonstrated that ignorance about the Holocaust is 
widespread. A 1992 Roper Survey found that thirty-eight percent of 
American high-school students and twenty-eight percent of American adults 
did not know what the Holocaust was.335 
Even supposedly well-educated people have difficulty identifying 
historical events related to the Holocaust. Many law students, for example, 
have never heard of Krystallnacht.336 Law professors, on the other hand, 
have a special responsibility to educate law students about those who would 
polarize by preaching doctrines of hatred, which logically and inevitably 
lead to acts of persecution.337 
The environment which enabled the Holocaust to happen has been 
described as the time "where technology was married to evil.,,338 The 
3JJ See Douglas, supra note 11, at 453. Douglas also notes that by translating evidence of 
unprecedented atrocity into crimes of war, the Nuremberg prosecution was able to create a coherent and 
judicially manageable narrative of criminality that seemed to defy rational and juridical explanation. 
See id. at 454. 
334 See GEORGE STEINER, LANGUAGE AND Sll.ENCE 118, 123 (1966). If Auschwitz is unique, deny-
ing other violent and arbitrary dominance should be outside the purview of punishment See supra note 
246 and accompanying text 
335 See Jaroff, supra note 64, at 83. 
336 "The Night of Broken Glass," Nov. 20, 1938, called by many the beginning of the Holocaust 
See 141 CONGo REc. SI6853 (dailyed. Nov. 9, 1995). Every year the author asks his Civil Liberties 
students (all of whom are upperclassmen) if they have ever heard of Krystallnachl. Few answer in the 
affirmative. 
m See generally Bruce Levine, An Education in Law-F"or What Purpose?, 34 WASHBURN LJ. 
516 (1995). 
338 Robert Trussell, Couple Brings Reality of Holocaust Home to Younger Viewers with 'Anne 
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Internet provides electronic forums called newsgroups---one of which is 
devoted to revisionist history.339 Recent patrons have included Bradley 
Smith's Holocaust-denying Institute for Historical Review. "The Holocaust 
story," says Smith, "is closed to free inquiry in our universities and among 
intellectuals. The Internet represents a huge potential audience at minimal 
COSt.,,340 Due to the enormous size of the Internet, it is virtually impossible 
to monitor for hate speech.341 
There can be little doubt that Holocaust denial will gain strength once 
there are no more victims alive to supply eyewitness testimony about Nazi 
atrocities.342 Meanwhile, though, it has become less and less difficult for 
Holocaust deniers to fmd gullible converts among the growing numbers of 
young people with but a tenuous grasp of basic history. 
The need to remember is made all the more critical by the existence of 
well-known political figures who at various times express sympathy for 
accused Nazi war criminals or doubt the extent of the Holocaust. The most 
notable current examples in the United States are recent presidential 
candidate Patrick Buchanan343 and Nation of Islam leader Louis 
Farrakhan.344 
Much can be learned by way of a well-produced video or fIlm, 
documenting in irrefutable detail the historical record of the Holocaust. 
Archival footage of the death camps themselves can be juxtaposed with 
statements by historians, victims, perpetrators, and liberators. Nazi records, 
Hitler's recorded speeches, and transcripts from the Wannassee Conference 
(at which the genocide was carefully planned) should also be made avail-
able. This kind of presentation should be unimpeachable and widely 
distributed, especially to college campuses.34S 
FranK, KANSAS CITY STAR, Mar. IS, 1996, at Preview 18 (quoting Marie Weitzman, Simon 
Wiesentbal Center). 
319 See AIlsion Sommer, Free Speech Advocates and Opponents Move Their Battle to the Net, 
JERUSALEM PosT, Feb. 9,1996, at 7. 
J4l Beck, supra note 12, at AI. 
34. See Carlos Alcala, Internet Warrior TaJces on Holocaust Revisionists, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 
16,1994, at AI; see also Daniel Akst, Postcard from Cyberspace, L.A. TiMEs, May 17, 1995, at 04; 
Sommer, supra note 339, at 7. 
342 See Judith Miller, Erasing the Past: Europe's Amnesia About the Holocaust, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 
16, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. 
34J See LiPsTADT, supra note 13, at 5-6; David A. Nacht, Book Note, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1802, 
1808 (1992) (reviewing ALAN OERSHOWITZ, CHunPAH (1991»; William F. Buckley, Jr., In Search of 
Anti-Semitism, NAT'L REv., Dec. 30, 1991, at 20; Report of the Anti-Defamation League on Pat 
Buchanan, L.A. JEWISH J., SepL 28, 1991; Jacob Weisberg, The Heresies of Pat Buchanan, NEW 
REPuBuc, OcL 22,1990, at 26-27. 
344 See supra note 16. In France the highly respected cleric Abbe Pierre recently lent credence to 
author Roger Garaudy's book, The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics, which sought to trivialize the 
HolocaUSL See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying texL 
34J See Dershowitz, Holocaust Video, supra note 10, at A6. 
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C. Liberty and Responsibility 
At the very least, if Holocaust denial is allowed to avoid the limita-
tions we have come to put on obscenity, defamation, state secrets, and other 
forms of expression not accorded First Amendment protection, certain 
fundamental principles should be clearly recognized. 
Holocaust deniers may self-publish their theories, but they are entitled 
to no greater access to the general press than anyone else. Their editorial 
and advertising matter can be constitutionally treated like that of defamers 
and pornographers. Moreover, it can be rejected at will by publishers who 
choose to do so for arbitrary reasons of ideology, space, fmancial consider-
ations, or even caprice.346 
Nor need public libraries carry all books and journals that are avail-
able. Indeed they cannot, nor should they have to. Even university research 
libraries must choose from among the vast amounts of resources procurable. 
Accepting material that is patently racist may be important in order to 
demonstrate that it exists, but few serious libraries would similarly carry a 
complete collection of pornography simply to satisfy a scholar's desire to 
analyze the difference between pornography and erotica. 
1. Libertarians as Teachers 
Just as few people would ever debate whether slavery existed in the 
United States, reasonable discussion about whether the Holocaust ever 
happened is unlikely. On the other hand, there is a strong need to educate 
the public about the truth.341 This is the express goal of museums like Yad 
Vashem in Israel and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 
America. The enlightenment that such places offer is invaluable for future 
generations, and should be mandatory for the current generation. But not 
everyone gets to Jerusalem or Washington. 
Although uninhibited discussion may indeed serve to advance the 
pursuit of truth, the dogmatic invocation of that principle in the context of 
hate speech carries the libertarian axiom too far. When speakers and writers 
deliberately misrepresent the work of historians, misquote witnesses, and 
fabricate evidence--as Holocaust deniers do---their "thoughts" tum the goal 
of truth-seeking in an open marketplace of ideas on its head. Contrary to 
the slippery slope so feared by civil libertarians-that it's too difficult to 
draw the line where hate speech should be limited without prohibiting all 
offensive speech-the free flow of racist hate-mongering could well lead to 
J.46 See supra Part D.A.2. 
W See generally Levine, supra note 337. 
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a place where true freedom is compromised for all, as it did in Nazi 
Gennany.348 
As academic librarians have come to recognize in trying to draw 
distinctions between legitimate Holocaust literature and racist Holocaust 
denial,349 there is no easy way to strike a balance between free speech and 
the suppression of bigotry. Advocates of hate-speech regulation offer well-
reasoned arguments that dialogue is fruitless without equality among the 
speakers. Defenders of free speech argue with equal reason that such liberty 
is an important instrument for achieving social justice-that is, equality 
presupposes liberty. Either value may be used to suppress the other: 
regulation of hate speech may lead to unfair censorship and coerced 
conformity; failure to regulate may lead to the oppression of minority 
groupS.3SO 
In its most perfect fonn, speech is exercised freely in an open market-
place of ideas, and serves to promote the quest for truth. In its least perfect 
fonn, it suppresses ideas, stifles social discourse, and provokes violence. 
Thus there is an interdependence between the right to speak and the 
responsibility to speak honestly. In so doing, the dignity of the target of the 
speech must be preserved. If the relationship between the right of free 
speech and the responsibility for free speech is ignored, the traditional 
justification for protecting it-that it promotes the quest for truth-is 
denied.3s1 
Holocaust denial is not an attempt at free inquiry, but at distortion. 
Universities are places where students are supposed to think critically, and 
have no moral responsibility to provide a platfonn for bigots whose sole 
purpose is to stir up hatred.3S2 
It may be the case that in the long run, being offended by insensitive 
language or even outright bigotry might be a small price to pay for the 
freedom of thought and expression. And there is nothing wrong with re-
evaluating history; offering new interpretations of old events--in fact, 
challenging entrenched dogma of all kinds-is what the academic enterprise 
348 See Lasson, supra note 140, at 123-29. 
,.. See supra DOtes 48-57 and accompanying text. 
'''' See generally Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of EJcpression 
and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 IOWA L. REv. 737 (1993). But Stefancic and Delgado find themselves 
in the same unresolved conflict as Prof. Abzug, supra note 8 and accompanying text, as illustrated by 
their Dot-very-conclusive concluding advice: ''Readers should distrust the facile urgings of both those 
who would dismiss the community and equal protection values at stake in the controversy over campus 
anti-racism rules as well as those who give little weight to the vitally important, historically rooted 
values of free expression and free speech." Id. at 23; see also STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, 
FREEDoM OF ExPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION (Sandra Coliver et al. eds., 1992). 
'" See generally Leon E. Trakman, Transforming Free Speech: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 
Dmo ST. LJ. 899 (1995). 
lS2 See Miller, supra note 342, at 30. 
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is about. Historians should be allowed to investigate any aspect of the 
events which have come collectively to be called the Holocaust with the 
same rigorous and impartial methods they would apply to any other 
historical event, and publish freely the results of their research. "To forbid 
this is itself a form of denial. "353 
But discarding past culture because it is deemed "white" or "patriar-
chal" or "Eurocentric" can hardly be understood as the honest scholar's 
quest for truth. Nor can denying the documented facts of history. 
2. Toward a More Responsible Press 
Various writers, comnnSSlons, and task forces have suggested new 
standards by which the press should be held more accountable. One of the 
most notable was the Hutchins Commission, which in 1947 published a 
report entitled A Free and Responsible Press.354 Uncomfortable with the 
characaterization of a free press offered by Charles Beard,35s the Commis-
sion offered this alternative conception: 
Today, this fonner legal privilege wears the aspect of social irresponsibility. 
The press must know that its faults and errors have ceased to be private vaga-
ries and have become public dangers. Its inadequacies menace the balance of 
public opinion. It has lost the common and ancient human liberty to be 
deficient in its function or to offer half-truth for the whole.3~ 
Other commentators have pointed out that there are many ways by 
which the press can abuse the freedom it possesses-such as excluding 
important points of view, actively distorting knowledge of public issues, 
adversely influencing the tone and character of public debate by playing to 
personal prejudices and fears, and fueling ignorance by avoiding public 
issues altogether.3S1 
Thus came the call for a redeftnition of the American concept of 
freedom: 
For the nation to survive, freedom can no longer be conceptualized as the mere 
liberty to pursue selfish gain .... The time has come to view the matter not 
simply in tenns of what the Constitution may do for the press, but what the 
press may do for the Constitution. The time has come to view the matter not 
J>3 Peter Simple, Denial, LoNDON DAlLY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 12, 1996, at AI. 
3>4 THE COMM'N ON FREEDoM OF THE PREss, A FREE AND REsPONSIBLE PREss: A GENERAL 
REPORT ON MAss COMMUNICATIONS (Univ. of Chicago Press 1947). The Commission on Freedom of 
the Press was chaired by Robert Maynard Hutchins. 
355 See supra note 138 and accompanying texL 
3,. FREEDoM OF THE PREsS, supra note 354, at 131. 
3S7 See LEE C. BOWNGER, IMAGFS OF A FREE PRFSs 26-27 (1991). 
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merely in tenns of freedom for the press, but also as freedom from the 
press.358 
83 
The Hutchins Report recommended a number of initiatives, including: 
(a) a truthful, comprehensive, intelligent account of events in a meaningful 
context; (b) a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism; (c) a 
means of conveying different opinions; (d) a method of presenting and 
clarifying social values and goals; and (e) a way to reach "every member of 
the society by the currents of information, thought, and feeling which the 
press supplies.,,3s9 The Report warned that freedom of the press is in 
dange~-that the press must become more responsible or face govern-
ment regulation: "The legal right will stand if the moral right is realized or 
tolerablyapproximated.,,361 
Others have urged adoption of legally enforceable codes of journalistic 
ethics, greater access to the press by those without realistic expectations of 
disseminating their views, stronger laws to protect privacy and reputation, 
and more meaningful restrictions on hate speech and pornography. The 
ultimate goal of a free press should be the presentation and clarification of 
the goals and values of society. 362 
A majority of colleges and universities seek to guarantee their student 
newspapers the same freedom of the press that the Constitution confers 
upon the private commercial media. Problems arise when student editors 
and school administrators interpret the First Amendment too broadly, as part 
of an implicit obligation to foster an open and vigorous marketplace of 
ideas, which in tum should guarantee access by anyone (students or the 
general public) to editorial and advertising pages. 
Such a constitutional perspective is both mistaken and misplaced. Too 
often overlooked is the simple logic of a free press: while a newspaper has 
a First Amendment right to publish what it pleases, it also has a First 
Amendment right to reject what it deems gratuitous or offensive. Such a 
rejection can be based on content, limited space, or ftnancial considerations. 
A similarly skewed argument is that, with respect to a state college or 
university, a refusal to publish amounts to an infringement of the author's 
First Amendment rights. But student editors have the same power to exer-
cise subjective discretion regarding the publication of proffered material as 
do their professional counterparts. To the contrary, for a school (or govern-
ment) to guarantee a newspaper the right to freedom of the press, and then 
358 Rodney A. Smolla, Report of the Coalition for a New America: Platform Section on Commu-
nications Policy, 1993 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 149, 155-56. 
359 FREEDoM OF TIlE PREss, supra note 354, at 20-21. 
360 See id. at 1. 
361 Id. at 131. 
362 See Smolla, supra note 358, at 184. 
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require it to publish certain material would create impossible contradictions 
in policy. Even if a public college or university newspaper is considered a 
state actor (and is guaranteed the right to freedom of the press), neither 
school officials nor the state nor the courts can force it to publish certain 
material. 
3. Falseness and Truth 
As noted earlier, little has been written about the harmful effects of 
speech that is known to be false. To the contrary, both scholars and 
journalists have become increasingly reluctant to argue that some view-
points should be beyond debate because they are simply wrong. They urge 
instead that in a truly democratic society everything should be open to 
debate: who, after all, should have the power to deem certain ideas true and 
others false? 
While philosophers may argue that there are no demonstrably false 
ideas, and while scientific propositions can never be proven absolutely true, 
a theory whose predictions fail the test of experimentation can and should 
be rejected-particularly if its acceptance and application would clearly 
cause injury. 
If we are unwilling. unilaterally. to brand scientific nonsense as just that ... 
then the whole notion of truth itself becomes blurred. The need to present both 
sides of an issue is only necessary when there are two sides. When empirically 
verifiable falsehoods become instead subjects for debate. then nonsense 
associated with international conspiracy theories. Holocaust denials and popular 
demagogues . . . cannot be effectively rooted out ... Our democratic society 
is imperiled as much by this as any other single threat, regardless of whether 
the origins of the nonsense are religious fanaticism. simple ignorance or 
personal gain.363 
Courts are authorized to take judicial notice of factual matters which 
are common knowledge and about which reasonable people would 
agree.364 Factual matters and opinions do merge and intertwine, but they 
remain distinguishable entities. Can American courts take judicial notice of 
the Holocaust as a historical fact, as has been done in Canada, France, and 
Germany? Indeed, one might draw a disturbing inference if they do not. 
And indeed a California court did take judicial notice of the Holocaust in 
J6J Lawrence Krauss. Opinion. Equal Time for Nonsense. N.Y. TIMEs. July 29. 1996. at A19. 
Krauss is chairman of the physics department at Case Western Reserve University. He goes on to cite 
favorably the advice passed on by Arthur Hays Sulzberger (publisher of the New York Times from 
1935-61): "I believe in an open mind. but not so open that your brains fall ouL" [d. 
164 See FED. R. EVID. 201; see also Debate. supra note 2. at 577-78. 
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the Mermelstein case (in which the plaintiff successfully sued to collect a 
reward offered by a Holocaust deniaJ groUp).365 This occurs despite liber-
tarian arguments that historicaJ events evolve in complex ways that cannot 
easily be encapsulated.366 
CONCLUSION 
The Holocaust faJls into that unique category of criminaJ maJevolence 
whose enormity puts it beyond the purview of traditionaJ standards of law 
and reason. Yet ignorance of its ever having happened is widespread-tbe 
tortured cries from the graves of the millions murdered out of madness, 
unheard. Indeed, as eyewitnesses to survivors of Nazi atrocities themselves 
pass away, Holocaust deniaJ has gained strength and growing acceptance. 
Thus the increasing importance of understanding that the expression of 
such thought need not be condoned in a free society. Although hate speech 
may be inevitable, it can be constitutionally restricted. Group-libel laws are 
viable even as civil liberties are fully protected. Tort actions can be pursued 
for intentionaJ infliction of emotionaJ distress; to that end American courts 
should adopt the Canadian view, linking the psychologicaJ and emotionaJ 
harm caused by hate propaganda to the target group's constitutionaJ right of 
equality. Even under the First Amendment, demonstrably faJse ideas can be 
prohibited and punished. 
At the very least, if Holocaust deniaJ is aJlowed to avoid the limita-
tions we have come to put on obscenity, defamation, disclosure of state 
secrets, and other forms of expression excluded from First Amendment 
protection, certain fundamenta1 principles should be clearly recognized. 
Holocaust deniers are not constitutionaJly entitled to access to someone 
else's press. Nor need public libraries carry their books and journa1s. 
Holocaust deniaJ should be recognized not as an attempt at free 
inquiry, but as an exercise in distortion. Universities should be regarded as 
places with the mora1 responsibility of training students to think criticaJly, 
not of providing platforms for bigots whose sole purpose is to stir up 
hatred. Allowing them to discard the documented facts of history can hardly 
be understood as the honest scholar's quest for truth. 
While philosophers may argue that there are no demonstrably faJse 
ideas, and while scientific propositions can never be proven absolutely true, 
a theory whose tenets fail the test of reason can and should be reject-
ed-particularly if its acceptance and application would cause provable 
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injury. 
When perpetrated in an academic environment, Holocaust denial is a 
particularly pernicious fonn of hate speech. On American campuses, 
regardless of whether a student organization is privately or publicly funded, 
rejection of its right to sponsor a Holocaust-denial speaker need not be 
viewed as suppression of free speech. Nor has freedom of the press been 
infringed when an advertisement denying the Holocaust is spurned by a 
student newspaper. Editorial discretion in a free society allows for-indeed, 
requires-the ability to reject as well as to accept material submitted by 
outside sources. That an individual or group has the wherewithal to pay for 
an advertisement does not guarantee access to a newspaper owned or 
operated by others. No newspaper can function successfully if it guarantees 
access to the general public. In short, an author's First Amendment rights 
stop at the editor's desk-as should any advertisement or essay that seeks 
to deny the tragedy of the Holocaust 
A majority of colleges and universities seek to guarantee their student 
newspapers the same freedom of the press that the Constitution confers 
upon private commercial media. Problems arise when student editors and 
school administrators interpret the First Amendment too broadly, as part of 
an implicit obligation to foster an open and vigorous marketplace of ideas, 
which in turn should guarantee access by anyone (students or the general 
public) to editorial and advertising pages. Such a constitutional perspective 
is both mistaken and misplaced. 
Most of the campus newspapers which have chosen to publish Holo-
caust-denial advertisements erroneously justify their decisions on First 
Amendment grounds-the author's right to free speech, or the paper's 
aversion to censorship. Too often overlooked has been a fair and reasonable 
application of basic journalistic precepts: to determine what stories are 
newsworthy, and to establish principled standards for advertising and 
editorial content. 
Thus have Holocaust deniers been able to disseminate their views. And 
thus do honest scholars have an obligation to condemn them. 
